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COLLOCATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY:
A FOSTERING OF COMPETITION ON THE MERITS?t
ALEXANDER C. LARSON*
DOUGLAS R. MUDD**

ABSTRACT
This article discusses the potential development of competition in the various local
telephone service market segments. The Federal Communications Commission, in
CC Docket 91-141, is considering requiring telephone companies to lease space
inside (or alternatively provide interconnection facilities just outside) their local
switching offices to accommodate the placement of competitors' telecommunications equipment, an arrangement known as collocation. An FCC policy decision
favoring the collocation of competitors' equipment on telephone company premises
will provide strong economic incentives for firms to enter the local telecommunications services market. However, whether increasing the number of firms supplying
various local telephone services will automatically achieve either a more efficient
industry structure or deliver benefits to consumers typically associated with actively
competitive markets is not certain. Allowing all industry suppliers to participate
in the competitive process, including incumbent telephone companies, will increase
the likelihood that policies designed to foster competition will ultimately produce
the full range of social benefits anticipated by regulators. Specifically, unless
regulatory constraints prohibiting telephone companies from quickly lowering prices
and negotiating individual service contracts with high volume customers are
relaxed, implementation of a national collocation policy will probably encourage
inefficient market entry while preventing market prices from declining to truly
competitive levels.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of competitive entry is not new to telecommunications.'
For example, competition for interexchange services began in 1956, when the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) opened a proceeding to
consider allocation of radio frequency bands above 890 megacycles. After
the Above 890 decision was rendered in 1959, entry into telecommunications

t This paper contains the opinions of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions, policies, or business plans of Southwestern Bell Corporation or any of its subsidiaries.
The authors wish to thank Warren Lavey, Calvin Monson, William Sharkey, Richard Simnett,
and Michael Zpevak, all of whom provided expert reviews of the manuscript in progress. The
authors also wish to thank Denise Kerksick and Maira Murphy, who provided thorough research
assistance.
* Senior Economist, Revenues and Public Affairs Department, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, St. Louis, MO.
** Economist, Revenues and Public Affairs Department, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, St. Louis, MO.
1. In fact, competitive entry first appeared in the 1890s when the two fundamental Bell
patents expired in 1893 and 1894. See GERALD R. FAULABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUB11C POuICY 1-2 (1987); and GERALD W. BROCK, THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 109-25 (1981).
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markets by non-Bell companies continued when the FCC granted a license
to Microwave Communications Incorporated (MCI) to construct and operate
a microwave system between Chicago and St. Louis. The Specialized
Common Carriersdecision, and two crucial appeals court decisions, allowed
MCI to offer a switched long distance service, known as Execunet, in
competition with American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation's
(AT&T's) direct-dial toll services. Finally, several other key FCC and court
decisions have attempted to solidify the competitive nature of various
telecommunications markets. 2 Thus, a great deal of FCC activity in the
common carrier area has contributed to the evolution of a competitive market
structure in the long distance and private line service markets. Moreover,
fostering further competition in telecommunications is an important public
policy objective of the current FCC chairman, Alfred Sikes?

2. In re Allocation of Frequencies Above 890 Megacycles, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959)
(allocation of radio spectrum in the frequency above 890 megacycles to private microwave users
regardless of whether common carrier service was available to them) [hereinafter Above 890];
In re Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 1008-09 (1969) (the
granting of a license to MCI enabling it to construct a microwave network between St. Louis
and Chicago to provide private line services on a common carrier basis) [hereinafter MCI]; In
re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide
Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio
Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Commission's Rules, 29
F.C.C.2d 870 (1971) (First Report and Order) (establishing an overall policy concerning new
entry to the private line market by what were designated as "specialized common carriers" and
ruling that the local exchange carriers must, upon request, permit these carriers to interconnect
with their facilities) [hereinafter Specialized Common Carriers];MCITelecommunications Corp.
v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ruling that MCI's Execunet service, though
substantially equivalent to AT&T's MTS and WATS service, was lawful), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1040 (1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(reversing Petition of AT&T for a Declaratory Ruling and Expedited Relief, FCC 78-142,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, released Feb. 28, 1978, which granted an AT&T petition for
declaratory ruling that it was under no obligation to provide intereonnection for Execunet
service), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978); In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, 81
F.C.C.2d 177 (1980) (Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed
Rulemaking) (formal adoption of an open entry policy for all interstate services, including MTS
and WATS); In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
Domestic Public Switched Network Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1980) (Report and Order)
(prohibiting tariff restrictions on the resale and shared use of MTS and WATS services); United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195-99 (D.D.C. 1982) (Modification
of Final Judgment), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 101 (1983) (requiring the Bell
Operating Companies and GTE to offer "1 +" equal access, otherwise known as Feature Group
D); In re MTS and WATS Market Structure Phase III, 100 F.C.C.2d 860 (1985) (Report and
Order) (extension of equal access obligations to the non-GTE independent telephone companies).
And see generally, BROCK, supra note 1; FAULHABER, supra note 1; William A. Brock & David
S. Evans, Creamskiming, in BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION 61 (David S. Evans ed., 1983); LELAND L. JOHNSON, COMPETITION AND CROSS-S-

UBSIDIZATION INTHE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (RAND Corporation Monograph R-2976-RC/NSF)
(1982); and, Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the Public Good: Regulation and Competition in
Telecomnmunications,

1910-1987, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27

(Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds., 1989).
3. See, e.g. Remarks of Alfred C. Sikes before the Federal Communications Bar
Association, Chicago Chapter (Aug. 9, 1991). See also, In re Competition in the Interstate
Interexchange Marketplace, 5 F.C.C.R. 2627 (1990) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); In re
Competition in the Interstate Interexehange Marketplace, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1135 (1991)
(Report and Order); In re Expanded Intereonnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities,
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The need to integrate the local exchange carriers' (LECs') public
network with various non-LEC telecommunications networks is an issue
integrally related to the subject of competition and its potential benefits to
telephone service customers. 4 Numerous competitive access providers
(CAPs) have constructed and are operating such networks, offering telecommunications users an alternative to LEC access services for obtaining
connections to Interexchange Carriers' (IXCs') nation-wide long distance
transmission facilities.' The FCC's primary proposal for integrating these
various networks involves a concept known in telecommunications as
collocation, in which other firms' transmission equipment is allowed to be
located inside or near telephone company local switching offices.' Proponents argue that only through this physical arrangement can interconnection
terms and conditions be achieved in a way which stimulates competition in
providing certain types of local telephone service. Another important
element in this view of the evolution of competition in the interexchange
access market is that LEC prices and services should be restructured such
that CAPs seeking collocation arrangements would only have to use selected
portions of what are currently offered as integrated LEC services. These
principles were submitted for regulatory review when Metropolitan Fiber
Systems, Inc. formally petitioned the FCC to establish rules and prices

6 F.C.C.R. 3259 (1991) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter

Expanded InterconnectionNPRM/N01]. Other recent Chairmen of the FCC have also considered
this an important policy goal.

See, e.g. Mark S. Fowler, et al., Back to the Future:A Model

for Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986); and, Henry Geller, The FCC Under
Mark Fowler: A Mixed Bag, 10 HAsnNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. (1988).
4. Among the largest LECs are the Bell telephone companies (also referred to as the Bell

Operating Companies, or BOCs):

Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific

Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and US West.
5. IXCs are long distance companies, such as AT&T, MCI, and US Sprint. Two of the
major CAPs are Metropolitan Fiber Systems, Inc. (MFS) and Teleport Communications Group.
The typical path followed by a long distance call involves its transmission across LEC owned

facilities (i.e., cables) connecting the originating residence or business location to a LEC local
switching office. The call would then be transported (again typically via LEC owned facilities)

to the appropriate IXC (as designated by the call's originator). CAPs have begun competing with
LECs in the provision of dedicated connections between telecommunications users' locations
(primarily large corporate customers occupying building space in the densely populated business

districts of major cities) and IXC's long distance networks. After traversing the IXC's interstate
toll network, the call would (usually) be delivered to a LEC central office in the terminating
city. The LEC would then terminate the call (via its facilities linking end users to local switching

offices) at the dialed telephone number. It is not uncommon for different LECs to handle the
originating and terminating portions of an interstate toll call.
6. The concept of collocation is explained in more detail in Section III of this article.
Collocation arrangements could soon be available to CAPs, IXCs, and large corporations that
rely heavily upon telecommunications services (e.g., banks, brokerages, and other financial
institutions). A local switching office is a building housing the switching equipment necessary
to connect cables leading from customers' telephone sets to cach other (both locally and long
distance). The switching equipment can accept customers' dialing instructions and direct calls
to their correct destinations. The terms "local switching office," "local serving office," and
"central office" will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
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governing the interconnection of CAP facilities and LEC local networks. 7
On June 6, 1991, responding to the petition and taking another step
toward the objective of fostering greater competition in telecommunications,
the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry
(NPRM/NOI) to elicit comments from the telecommunications industry on
the subject of competition in providing interstate access services! The
FCC's stated reason for beginning this proceeding was "to remove barriers
that currently impede the development of greater competition in the provision
of interstate access transmission facilities, and thereby unlock the potential
for a substantially broadened scope of competition in interstate telecommunications." 9 The focus of the FCC, therefore, appears to be on encouraging
the deployment of alternative transmission facilities (primarily fiber optic
cable) linking LEC local switching offices to IXC interstate toll networks.
In moving toward its vision of a competitive local transport market, the
FCC has requested comments regarding price structures most likely to create
incentives for CAPs (and even IXCs themselves) to provide transmission
capacity between local telephone company offices and long distance
companies' networks as an alternative to existing LEC facilities. In
particular, the FCC is seeking to establish reasonable and nondiscriminatory
prices for interconnecting, non-LEC transmission equipment (e.g., fiber optic
cable and all necessary electronic devices) located within, or near, LEC
central offices.'" In addition, the FCC has requested opinions regarding the
appropriate terms, and conditions which should govern collocation arrangements.'" Detailed solutions to such issues as the monitoring and control of
transmission equipment, the maintenance and repair of that equipment, the
rights of non-LEC personnel to access LEC property, the rental of LEC
central office space, and numerous other administrative and technical aspects
inherent in collocation arrangements are required for the practical application
of "expanded interconnection rights" to successfully motivate interstate
access competition. 2
The FCC's intention to establish binding collocation guidelines, complete
with formally tariffed prices, terms, and conditions, is apparently based on
the FCC's firmly held view of the social benefits expected to flow from
competitive markets.13 From an economic perspective, merely encouraging
7. Petitioner's Brief for the FCC, In re Interconnection of Exchange Access Carrier
Facilities (RM-7249) (Petition for Rulemaking) (filed by Metropolitan Fiber Systems, Inc. on
November 14, 1989) [hereinafter Metropolitan Fiber Systems Petition]. Similar petitions were
filed by CAPs in the States of California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas.
8. Expanded Interconnection NPRM/NOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259. Interstate access services
provide for the linkage between LEC local networks and IXC interstate long distance
transmission facilities.

9. Id.1 1.
10. Id. 1 37-43.

11. Id.11 19-28.
12. Id. 131.
13. Id. 11 3, 13-14.
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entry into the provision of IXC access services does not guarantee the
development of an actively competitive market. The possibility that the full
benefits promised by truly competitive markets will not accompany
implementation of a national collocation policy cannot be dismissed. Indeed,
before initiating a precedent-setting policy designed to foster greater
competition in the IXC access market, the extent to which potential benefits
are likely to be realized must be reasonably assessed. Such is the aim of
both this article and (at least partially) the FCC's recent NPRM/NOI.
By affording CAPs favorable regulatory treatment, the FCC can almost
guarantee an increased number of suppliers in the IXC access market. While
IXCs rely upon LECs for the local distribution of most long distance traffic,
CAPs have recently emerged as suppliers of dedicated circuits directly
connecting selected large businesses to IXCs' networks. The effect of CAPs
as competitors can be broadened by regulatory policies designed specifically
to enhance the CAPs' market positions. However, the success of competitors
does not always necessarily imply the success of competition. In other
words, the widespread benefits typically expected to result from injecting
competition into a regulated market need not automatically accompany the
financial gains experienced by firms entering the market. Public policy
decisions which restrict incumbent LECs' attempts to quickly change the
prices of services offered in competitive markets could result in little more
than a wealth transfer from telephone companies to new entrants without
producing the benefits typically associated with vigorous price competition.
The advent of allowing new competitors to enter the tightly regulated
local exchange market brings expectations of product and service innovation,
rapid deployment of technological advances, telecommunications infrastructure enhancement, expanded output, and generally lower market prices. In
addition to directly achieving these results themselves, the new CAP entrants
might be expected to stimulate incumbent LECs to become more efficient,
responsive, and creative suppliers determined to avoid or minimize financial
losses to competitors. 4 These expectations, however, may be ambitious in
light of the CAPs' current focus on competing only for the largest and most
lucrative corporate accounts. While large businesses have, to some extent,
reaped the benefits of competition in the IXC access market, it is not clear
that the majority of telecommunications customers have benefitted from
CAPs' activities.1

14. These, or similar, expectations are held by the FCC. See id.
15. In fact, several telephone companies' maintain that their overall price structures seem to
have been designed to encourage the consumption of a particular service (e.g., basic local
telephone service) by ensuring relatively low prices for that service. Continuing relatively low
local service prices depends, to some extent, upon an ability to maintain the prices of other
telephone company services well in excess of the costs of providing those services. If LEC
interexchange access revenues are contributing toward the maintenance of low local service
prices and the future magnitude of those revenue streams becomes more uncertain as competition
intensifies, upward pressure on local telephone service prices could ultimately arise. Most of the
Bell telephone companies have filed arguments consistent with this description in their Comments
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Thus, the emergence of the CAPs raises some rather troubling questions
for future telecommunications public policy. First, will public policies
designed to encourage the entry and financial success of the CAPs foster true
competition on the merits, characterized by spirited price competition and
lawful battles for market share (and hence lower prices to customers in
general)? CAPs contend that fully integrating their networks with the LECs'
is the only way to achieve meaningful competition, and its resultant benefits
in the local exchange market. CAPs further maintain that the most effective
way to accomplish this network integration and deliver the benefits of
competition throughout the local access market is to adopt a regulatory policy
permitting the collocation of CAP transmission equipment inside (or
physically near) LEC local serving offices. However, giving CAPs
collocation privileges will not necessarily increase customer benefits
substantially beyond the level associated with their current activities.
Second, a corollary to this first troubling public policy question, is
whether such policies could merely foster economically inefficient
"creamskimmer" entry, which could effectively redistribute profits among
firms in the industry, but will not really lead to the ultimate benefits that true
competition can produce, such as lower prices to customers.16 The most
direct way to distinguish creamskimmer entry from entry by efficient firms
is to examine the costs and prices of both the incumbent and entrant. This
analysis is quite impractical as a regulatory exercise. Fortunately, however,
another alternative exists. Regulators could allow unlimited downward
pricing flexibility for the incumbent market suppliers in conjunction with
allowing entry. The competitive response of the incumbent will cause
inefficient entrants to exit the market eventually while efficient entrants
would remain. Thus, if creamskimmer entry is a possibility, then public
policies that deregulate entry but notpricingmay produce the opposite of the
desired result-economically inefficient investment and excess capacity, a
lack of true price competition, and the inefficient extension of asymmetric
regulation to the local exchange. 7

(dated August 6, 1991) responding to the FCC's Expanded Interconnection NPRMINOI. See,
e.g., Comments of the Ameritech Operating Companies, pp. 60-61; Comments of Bell Atlantic,
pp. 9-12; Comments of the BellSouth Telephone Companies, p. 72-73; Comments of the
NYNEX Telephone Companies, pp. 31-33; Comments of Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell, pp.
60-63; and Comments of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, p. 21.
16. A creamskimmer is merely an economically inefficient entrant that can only enter a
market, and survive, if regulation produces an incumbent market supplier that must charge prices
that are too high, and that cannot lower its prices in response to competition.
17. These issues are not new to telecommunications law. In Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 771, 775-76 (1974), the court ruled that the FCC, in granting authority to RCA Global
Communications, Inc. to provide private line voice-only telephone service between Hawaii and
the mainland U.S., considered the factor of "competition" improperly; not in terms primarily
as to its benefits to the public, but with the objective of equalizing competition among
competitors.
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I. To LEARN FROM HISTORY, OR TO REPEAT Ir?

Let us rather welcome competition but face the issues it poses. The
question then is to determine the proper response of the common
carriers to the new situation. Are the existing prices and other
policies of the common carriers in the communications industry
appropriate in the regime of competition?18
When Sir Ronald Coase expressed this approach to public policy in 1970
in the first issue of the Bell Journalof Economics and Management Science,
his comments referred to the FCC's Above 890 decision and the AT&T
Telpak tariffs, yet they would be equally applicable to the issue of collocation
in 1992. In examining the policy of collocation to foster competition,
Coase's question is the first one that an economist analyzing such public
policies would wish to see answered. Thus, are we to learn from the history
of entry into the telecommunications markets, and the way in which
incumbent firm responses to it were handled with respect to public policy,
or are we to continue in a Twilight Zone of regulation, endlessly living and
reliving the same scenario over and over again, with minor variations but no
resolution? Given history, one could reasonably expect the latter.
This article makes no attempt to provide a comprehensive history of the
relevant past dockets before the FCC that have paralleled the issues that the
Expanded InterconnectionNPRMINOI has raised. The scholarship necessary
for a sound historical base from which to work has already been provided by
a number of other authors. 19 Instead, this section will revisit some of this
history and examine the relevant parallels with the Expanded Interconnection
NPRMINOI to draw on lessons that have been learned elsewhere.
Since 1959, beginning with the Above 890 decision, the FCC's policies
towards AT&T can generally be characterized as fostering entry by
alternative suppliers, with little or no corresponding deregulation of AT&T's
allowed pricing. Thus, asymmetric regulation of AT&T gradually became
the regulatory status quo.' In particular, the FCC has been reluctant to

18. Ronald H. Coase, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application, 1 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 113, 125 (1970).
19. See BROCK, supra note 1, at 198-233; FAU.HABER, supra note 1, at 23-57; Brock &
Evans, supra note 2; JOHNSON, supra note 2; Victor, supra note 2, at 60-80; and, CHARLES F.
PHILUPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBU1C UTIUTES 457-61 (1985).
20. The transition to asymmetric regulation in the long distance market was due primarily
to the Competitive Carrier Proceedings. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 77 F.C.C.2d 308
(1979) (Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d
1 (1980) 215 (First Report and Order) (defining the "dominant" and "nondominant" classifications of firms subject to regulation); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 187 (1982)
(Second Report and Order), recon. denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983) (forbearance from regulation
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grant AT&T downward pricing flexibility to any significant extent.
The proceedings from this period most parallel to the ExpandedInterconnection NPRM/NOI are probably the Above 890 decision, with the resulting
strategic pricing behavior of AT&T via the Telpak tariffs, and the Specialized
Common Carriersdecision.2" Both of these involved fostering competition
via increased entry by alternate suppliers, and in both, the issues of creamskimming and competitive pricing responses were discussed. Thus, the FCC
activity begun in 1959 with the Above 890 decision, and culminating in the
1970s with the Specialized Common Carriersdocket, can be considered the
private line and long distance analog to the current proceeding.'
When Above 890 was being considered, AT&T argued that entry by
alternative carriers would consist of inefficient, duplicative creamskimmer
entry. The FCC rejected this argument and allowed entry, but shortly after
new entrants appeared, AT&T filed its famous Telpak tariffs as a competitive
response. Thus, for quite some time, AT&T did have some measure of de
facto downward pricing flexibility in engaging the specialized common
carriers in spirited price competition, and did so, though this was not done
with the approval of the FCC. The Telpak tariffs offered reduced rates for
large bundles of private lines and were geared to users who might otherwise
choose to build their own microwave systems. Hence, Telpak was a
competitive response even though the FCC did not approve these tariffs and
eventually rejected them as unlawful. These tariffs were declared unlawful

of terrestrial services); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (1982) (Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 48 Fed. Reg.
46,791 (1983) (Third Report and Order) (extending scope of proceeding to include services
provided to all domestic points outside the United States, including Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto
Rico); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorization Therefor, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,292 (1983) (Third Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983) (Fourth Report
and Order) (ruling that domestic satellite carriers, companies owning satellite transponders,
direct broadcast satellite common carriers, and various other carriers lacking market power
should be characterized as nondominant); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 96 F.C.C.2d 922
(1984) (Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); In re Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984) (Fifth Report and Order) (extension of forbearance to domestic satellite
carriers, all domestic, interstate, interexehange services of carriers affiliated with exchange
telephone companies, miscellaneous common carriers, and digital electronic message service
networks); In re Policy and rules Concerning Rules for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorization Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985) (Sixth Report and Order), rev'd
and remanded sub. noma., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (FCC's attempt to require forborne carriers to withdraw tariffs on file and to prohibit
them from filing tariffs altogether, struck down by U.S. Court of Appeals as being beyond the
FCC's discretion in interpreting the Communications Act of 1934).
21. Above 890, 27 F.C.C. 359; Specialized Common Carriers,29 F.C.C.2d 870.
22. Above 890, 27 F.C.C. 359; MCI, 18 F.C.C.2d 953; Specialized Common Carriers, 29
F.C.C.2d 870.
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in 19761 after a protracted examination of AT&T's rate of return and its
costs in a study known as the Seven-Way Cost Study, which sought to
determine which services were subsidizing which, using rates of return for
service categories. The resulting rates of return were computed using several
different fully-distributed cost methodologies (hence the name of the study,
which actually used nine different methodologies for allocating costs).'
Ironically, users of Telpak had become so dependent on the bulk rate service
that they protested its discontinuation! Thus, in 1980, twenty years after the
Telpak tariffs were filed, they were withdrawn, even though AT&T had
produced studies that indicated Telpak covered AT&T's incremental costs of
service.
Essentially, Telpak was an involuntary FCC pricing experiment that
worked, allowing AT&T to meet competition while satisfying AT&T's
customers by giving them lower prices. As Coase pointed out, it amounted
to a form of price discrimination that furthered the public interest.-5
In Specialized Common Carriersthe issue of creamskimming again was
discussed. The FCC concluded that "there is sufficient ground for a
reasonable expectation that new entry here will have some beneficial
effects."I This conclusion was based on a finding that (1) revenue
diversion would be unlikely to have a great effect given the markets being
entered, and (2) any such adverse effect caused by revenue diversion would
be exceeded by potential benefits of entry.' The FCC stated:
We do not see how there could be any diversion of revenues of a
magnitude to have the impact claimed by AT&T, in view of the
very small percentage of AT&T's existing total market that is
vulnerable to competition of the kind proposed here, the growth rate
of Bell's basic services, and the likelihood that AT&T would obtain
a very substantial share of the potential market for specialized
services.?
The FCC thus made the creamskimming argument of AT&T moot by finding
that revenue diversion was unlikely to result from competitive entry.
As in the case of the Above 890 decision and the Telpak tariffs which
resulted, AT&T filed aggressive tariffs as a competitive response to entry
after Competitive Common Carriers. The first of these, the Hi-Lo tariffs,

23. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Department Revisions of Tariff FCC No.
260 Private Line Services, Series 5000 (TELPAK), 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976) (ruling against
TELPAK C and D). TELPAK A and B were rejected in 1964. In re American Tel. & Tel.
Co., Tariff FCC No. 250, TELPAK Service and Channels, 38 F.C.C. 370 (1964).
24. FAULI-IABER, supra note 1, at 26.
25. Coase, supra note 18, at 126-127.
26. Specialized Common Carriers,29 F.C.C.2d at 905.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 910.
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which broke from national average pricing, were filed in 1973. These rates
were, according to AT&T, justified on both an incremental cost basis and a
fully-distributed cost basis. What followed was the same basic story as
Telpak, with few substantive alterations.' After years of investigation, the
FCC ruled that these tariffs were unlawful. When AT&T then filed its
Multi-Schedule Private Line tariff, a modification of the Hi-Lo tariff, the
FCC repeated the investigation scenario yet again, eventually declaring the
tariff unlawful, though the tariff remained in effect for quite some time.
Subsequent FCC orders sought to afford the so-called "dominant"
carriers such as AT&T downward pricing flexibility while maintaining
.safeguards against anticompetitive pricing practices. FCC orders consistent
with these policies first appeared in 1985, fourteen years after Specialized
Common Carriers,seven years after the court decisions enabling MCI to
continue offering its Execunet service, and five years after formal adoption
of an open entry policy for all interstate services, including MTS and
WATS.
While these regulatory proceedings were designed to promote competition, their effect on end user prices is still uncertain, even though lower end
user prices is one of the primary benefits of competition. While long
distance prices have fallen steadily in the years since divestiture, much of this
can be attributed to the use of subscriber line charges and AT&T's simultaneous flow-through of the resultant access charge savings to its end users, via
FCC mandate, through lower long distance prices. 1 Ironically, nineteen
years after Specialized Common Carriers,fourteen years after the Execunet
decisions in the courts, and ten years after entry was opened up to competitors for all interstate services (with resale and the shared use of MTS and
WATS services allowed),32 the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaki-

29. As Coase has pointed out, however, "This does not mean that AT&T's own cost
calculations were necessarily correct. But a critical examination of these calculations should have
concentrated on whether they accurately measured the additional costs incurred by the system
as a result of the TELPAK service." Coase, supra note 18, at 126.
30. In re Guidelines for Dominant Carriers' MTS Rates and Rate Restructure Plans, 50 FED.
REG. 42,946 (1985) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (proposing the net revenue test as a
means of testing the lawfulness of price reductions in the form of optional calling plans).
31. In re MTS and WATS Market Structure and Amendment of Part 67 of the Commission
Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (1983) (Third Report and Order).
The SLC program substituted flat rate monthly charges per basic service access line for per
minute access charges paid by IXCs to LECs for the local distribution of interexchange toll
traffic. In effect, telecommunications customers perceived an increase in flat rate telephone
service (usually associated with local service) and a simultaneous reduction in long distance
charges as the FCC shifted the mechanism for recovering the fixed costs of providing local
service from usage sensitive prices paid by IXCs to flat rate charges paid directly by end users.
32. In re MTS and WVATS Market Structure, 81 F.C.C.2d 177 (1980) (Report and Third
Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking) (formal adoption of an open entry
policy for all interstate services, including MTS and WATS); In re Regulatory Policies
Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network
Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1980) (Report and Order) (prohibiting tariff restrictions on the
resale and shared use of MTS and WATS services).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss2/4

10

Larson and Mudd: Collocation and Telecommunications Policy: A Fostering of Competi

19921

COLLOCATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

ng to33 determine if the interstate long distance market truly was competitive.
While AT&T was not granted explicit downward pricing flexibility by
the FCC, it did have some de facto pricing flexibility in the form of the
Telpak, Hi-Lo, and Multi-Schedule Private Line tariffs. Despite the FCC's
eventual finding that these tariffs were unlawful (using the basic
fully-distributed cost methodology and results of the Seven-Way Cost Study),
an antitrust court applying the Areeda-Turner standard for predatory pricing
would probably not have found for any plaintiff suing AT&T under Section
2 of the Sherman Act.' The Areeda-Turner standard was not devised until
1975, however, and hence was never applied to the AT&T tariffs cited
here.35 Though this standard served as the basis of a number of predatory
pricing claims in the years after it was developed,' the pre-Areeda-Turner
AT&T probably did not engage in pricing behavior that would have violated
this standard. Further, in the post-Areeda-Turner period in which several
cases have been filed on the basis of this standard, the cases involving AT&T
as defendant did not find AT&T violative of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which is the antitrust court analog to what the FCC was addressing with its
Seven-Way Cost Study. 7
In a related way, and as this article will point out, several court cases
have indicated that meeting competition is an absolute defense to allegations
of predatory pricing, apparently even if prices fall below average variable
cost." As it turned out, none of these cases involved AT&T.
Thus, in examining history, the courts have not found AT&T's price
reductions or price competition with its rivals to be abusive or anticompetit-

33. In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 5 F.C.C.R. 2627 (1990)
(Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The FCC eventually decided that a segment of the interstate
toll market was sufficiently competitive to permit streamlining their regulation of most AT&T
services in the "business services" price cap basket. In re Competition in the Interstate
Interexchange Marketplace, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1135 (1991) (Report and Order).
34. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the monopolization of interstate trade
or commerce).
35. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). The Areeda-Tumer test used
short-run marginal cost as the cost-based brightline for determining predatory versus
non-predatory pricing behavior. The cost standard of average variable cost was suggested as a
proxy to short-run marginal cost if the computation of the latter cost standard was too difficult
in practice. In their 1978 treatise, Areeda and Turner modified their 1975 standard by casting
the presumption of legality for pricing at or above marginal cost as being rebuttable rather than
conclusive. See 3 PHILUP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTI-TRUST LAW 1 71 Id (1978).
36. See Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to
Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052 (1986), for a history and critique of the application
of the Areeda-Turner standard.
37. Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1005 (1985).
38. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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ive. The relatively small amount of pricing flexibility afforded AT&T by the
FCC, and the de facto unsanctioned pricing flexibility AT&T had via Telpak
and other tariffs, did not lead to antitrust damages or abuses that should
preclude considerable pricing flexibility for incumbents in the current
telecommunications marketplace.
In summary, the FCC need not allow its decision on interexchange
access competition to become merely Specialized Common Carriersredux.
It can avoid this by (1) examining the true value of allowing the CAPs to
service the market, (2) allowing the LECs virtually unlimited pricing
flexibility with no onerous regulatory requirements or showings of costs, and
(3) designing a contribution element that will help to ensure market entry
takes place only by efficient firms that can offer lower prices to customers
while maintaining the revenue flows to benefitted services.
II. CAPs EMERGE As ACCESS PROVIDERS
CAPs initially focused on providing dedicated private line connections
between corporate locations and IXCs' long distance networks. For example,
CAPS deployed high capacity fiber optic transmission facilities to connect
business locations (such as two buildings occupied by a single corporation),
to link IXC Points-of-Presence (POPs) (by either connecting several different
POPs of the same carrier or tying together the POPs of different carriers),
and to establish facility bypass arrangements between customers' locations
and IXC POPs."

Rapid construction activity over the past few years has produced CAP
networks within the downtown core business districts of many of the largest
cities in the country. Assuming the successful completion of announced
construction plans, the CAP industry will have expanded from three networks
in three cities in 1987 to about forty networks in more than twenty-five cities
by the early 1990s.' The industry has invested over $500 million to
finance this proliferation of CAP networks. 4 Based on this network
investment, CAP industry revenues were expected to reach $220 million by
1991.42

CAPs strive to project an image of prompt suppliers of premium services
at discount prices. For example, CAPs can negotiate contracts with different
terms, conditions, and prices for providing specific services to different
customers. Changes to the terms, conditions, and prices of LEC service

39. "Facility bypass" refers to customers' ability to access IXC toll networks without using
LEC transmission facilities.
40. John T. Mulqueen, The Rise of the MAN Handlers, DATA COMM., Oct. 1989, at 67, 67
(citing Kessler Marketing Intelligence, Inc. (a Newport, Rhode Island based research firm) as
the source of this information).
41. Id.
42. Fred Knight & Robert Vinton, FiberDrives Competition in the Local Loop, BUS. COMM.
REV., Dee. 1989, at 31, 33 (quoting Richard Mack of Kessler Marketing Intelligence).
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offerings, however, typically require formal regulatory proceedings. Thus,
CAPs could be more likely than LECs to respond quickly and precisely to
customers' unique demands.43 In addition, CAPs can take full advantage
of the most recent, most sophisticated technologies in designing and installing
their networks." Typically, fiber optic transmission facilities and advanced
monitoring systems are included in CAP networks.' Finally, CAPs usually
price their services about ten to twenty percent lower than the tariffed rates
of the LECs serving the cities in which CAPs have chosen to construct
networks. 6
Perhaps the most significant aspect of CAPs' operations in
establishing competition in the local exchange is the perception that alternate
networks effectively provide "insurance" against LEC network failures. A
highly publicized 1988 fire that destroyed an LEC local switching office
outside Chicago brought the issues of disaster recovery and telecommunications network protection to the attention of the entire U.S. business
community.47 Following this disaster, inferences were drawn that if a CAP
network is present in an area affected by an LEC's inability to maintain
continuous service, businesses would have the opportunity to avoid the loss
of telecommunications links to the rest of the world.' However, to the
extent that CAPs' networks contain a single hub or control point analogous
to an LEC local switching office, they are susceptible to the same types of
disasters that struck the LEC facilities in Illinois. As a result, businesses can
not expect entirely to avoid the risk of losing telecommunications links to the
IXCs' long distance networks by using CAP services exclusively. Rather,
the value of CAPs' networks in satisfying the demand for disaster recovery
appears to be as complements to, rather than complete substitutes for, LEC
network services.49

Thus, corporations (and governmental entities) that rely on telecommuni-

43. See Anita Taff, Alternative Carriers Gaining User Favor, NETWORK WORLD, July 17,
1989, at 11, 12.
44. It is more difficult for an LEC to follow the same investment and marketing strategies
employed by CAPs. LECs must provide network ubiquity and maintain common carrier

obligations. These two obligations require significant sunk costs to be incurred and recovered,
making it potentially more difficult for an LEC simply to write off or scrap current investment
for new, more efficient technology.
45. More detail is provided in Dawn Bushaus, Weaving an Alternative, TELEPHONY, Sept.

11, 1989, at 48, 54.
46. Mulqueen, supra note 40, at 67.
47. In May 1988 a fire destroyed an Illinois Bell central office in the Chicago suburb of

Hinsdale. An estimated 35,000 to 45,000 customers were affected; many were without service
for nearly a month. The major IXCs quickly connected large corporate customers directly to
POPs using microwave radios. See Mary Lu Carnavale, MCI, AT&TActed to Plug in Business

of Midwest Clients, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1988, at 26 (Midwest ed.); and Fire Shows Phone Net
Vulnerable, ST. LOuis POST-DISPATCH, June 5, 1988, at 5C.

48. Mark A. Kellner, MFS Rises From Chicago Ashes, MIS WEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 21,
21; and Steven Titch, Fire Sparked Business for Metropolitan Fiber, COMM. WEEK, Feb. 13,
1989, at 54, 54.

49. This does not imply that CAP facilities will not displace current LEC services. However,
businesses might be reluctant to disconnect all LEC circuits in favor of a CAP's services.
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cations services as an important determinant of their financial health are
actively implementing strategies to avoid loss of access to national telephone
networks. In addition, high volume telecommunications users are seeking
changes in the prices at which such technologically sophisticated network
arrangements are supplied. Both CAPs and LECs are striving to meet these
market expectations. CAPs, however, are further seeking regulatory support
for a market structure which would require LECs to aggregate and deliver
traffic to their competitors.
III. THE CONCEPT OF COLLOCATION
Collocation is a special form of interconnection. Interconnection refers
to the transmission facilities and software interfaces that reciprocally connect
LEC networks with another provider's facilities (e.g., IXCs' networks). The
interconnection facility is generally provided by the LEC, at a charge, and
telecommunications traffic is delivered by the LEC to the interconnector's
point-of-presence or network node. Under the FCC's Open Network
Architecture (ONA) concept, for example, interconnection arrangements
provided by a Bell Operating Company (BOC) to competing enhanced service
providers must be (1) functionally equivalent to the network connections used
by the BOC in providing its own service; (2) available to all prospective
interconnectors on an equal, nondiscriminatory basis; and (3) provided at
minimum transport costs."
To reduce or eliminate the transmission costs of interconnection, some
enhanced service providers and other telecommunications firms, have sought
approval to place transmission facilities, such as fiber optic cable, inside or
near LEC local serving offices, with the interconnector's termination
equipment (e.g., multiplexers) located in close physical proximity to the
relevant LEC network equipment (e.g., switches).5" Therefore, existing
LEC price levels and tariff structures are probably important elements in
some CAPs' network deployment strategies.
A. LEC Interexchange Access Pricing
LEC interexchange access services and facilities currently provide a

50. In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry); Policy and Rules for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Authorizations Thereof; Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1039, 1042 (1986) (Report and Order). Enhanced
services combine telecommunications transmission services with computer processing
applications. Examples of enhanced services include database inquiry services, electronic mail,
and packet switching with protocol conversion. See Walter Sapronov, A Primeron Telecommunications Law and Regulation, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW 12 (W. Sapronov ed.,
1988).
51. For a concise description of what constitutes collocation from federal regulators'
19-27.
viewpoint, see Expanded Interconnection NPRM/NOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259
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crucial link between telecommunications users and IXCs' global long distance
networks. Much of the toll traffic reaching IXCs' transmission facilities
relies upon network instructions provided by LEC switching equipment. In

addition, heavy users of telecommunications services, primarily large
businesses, that generate large volumes of long distance traffic can take
advantage of service arrangements that bypass LEC switches and directly

connect customer locations to IXC networks. Different pricing structures
apply to the different methods by which end users access IXC facilities5
LEC special access service provides a dedicated private line connection
between a customer's location and either another end user location (usually
a different location of the same customer) or an IXC POP. This dedicated
circuit is typically routed through one or more LEC local serving offices
before it is terminated. The service is priced as a recurring monthly flat
rate. LEC special access service charges are based on two channel
termination (CT) charges and a distance sensitive component (channel
mileage-CM-charge). The CT charges are associated with (1) the portions
of the private line that connect the customer location to the LEC local
serving office on one end, and (2) the connection between the LEC central
office and the termination point of the circuit (either a customer location or
an IXC POP) on the other end. The channel mileage charges (CM) are
assessed on the basis of the distance between the LEC office serving the
customer and the office serving the IXC POP or other terminating point. If
both the originating and terminating points of a special access circuit are
served by the same LEC central office, no mileage charges apply.
On the following page, Figure 1 illustrates the charges that apply to a
special access circuit. In Diagram A, mileage charges apply because more
than one LEC local serving office is involved in the transmission path. In
Diagram B, only one LEC local serving office is required to complete the
transmission path and mileage charges do not apply.
LEC switched access service provides for both the delivery of a long
distance message originating from a customer's location (e.g., individual
residence or business) to an IXC POP, and the carriage of long distance
traffic from an IXC switch to the terminating customer location. Switched
access service is provided over the same transmission facilities used to
connect customers to the LEC local switched network. Charges for switched
access service which are both time and distance sensitive are assessed to

52. Charges are assessed by LECs to recover the costs incurred in the local transport and

switching of long distance messages requiring access to (or distribution from) IXCs' toll
networks. IXCs pay these switched access charges for each long distance minute of use
originated (and terminated) over the LECs' local networks. Alternatively, dedicated circuits can

be leased from LECs to establish direct connections between IXC networks and business
locations that generate large volumes of toll usage. These flat rate monthly recurring special

access charges are typically assessed to IXCs, but large corporations also lease special access
circuits from LECs. In addition, such large corporations, IXCs, or third parties (such as CAPs)
can construct and operate facilities linking business locations to IXC networks, thereby bypassing

the LECs entirely.
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IXCs who, in turn, likely incorporate at least a portion of these charges into
the long distance rates paid by end users. That is, the price for switched
access service is specified per minute of use and contains a mileage
component. The mileage component of the price, the local transport charge,
is associated with the distance between the LEC central office that serves the
customer location making or receiving long distance calls and the LEC
central office serving the IXC POP.53 Even in the event that both the end
user location and the IXC POP are served by the same LEC central office,
the LEC assesses a local transport charge per minute of switched access
usage.54
In addition to the local transport (L) element, prices for switched access
service also reflect a charge for the local switching (LS) functions required
of the LEC to ensure both that originating long distance calls are directed to
each customer's chosen IXC and terminating toll calls are correctly
delivered. Finally, a charge designed to recover a portion of the fixed costs
53. While the intent of the local transport rate element might be to recover the costs from
the end user local serving office all the way to the POP, the distance used in computing the
charge reflects the mileage between the end user serving LEC central office and the POP serving
LEC central office.
54. Local transport mileage bands include a 0-1 mileage category.
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associated with the provision of basic local telephone service, the carrier
common line (CCL) charge, is included in the switched access price per
minute paid by IXCs. Figure 2 illustrates the charges that apply to a
switched access call.

Switc ed Access Price Components

LSO
Lso
CCLT
LS

LSO
POP
CCL
LS
LT

-

Local Serving Office
IXC Point of Presence
Carrier Common Line Charge
Local Switching Charge
Local Transport Charge

Figure 2
To the extent that LEC access charges, both switched and special, are
based on the average cost of supplying these services throughout an LEC's
entire operating territory, the same prices apply to all customers (IXCs and
end users) regardless of geographic location and traffic volumes.55 Volume
discounts are currently not included in FCC regulatory treatment of LECs.
Thus, in areas where the direct costs of supplying service are probably
relatively low and traffic volumes are highly concentrated, as typically found
in major urban areas, LEC access prices are likely significantly higher than
relevant costs. This price-cost relationship is one factor motivating
interexchange toll market participants' search for alternatives to LEC access
service. Collocation arrangements could provide one such alternative.

55. The following descriptions of physical and virtual collocation are consistent with the
FCC's views, appearing in the ExpandedInterconnection NPRMINOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259
1827.
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B. CollocationArrangements
Physical collocation is an arrangement whereby an interconnector
actually places its own transmission and termination equipment inside a LEC
local serving office. ' Physical collocation would not only eliminate any
transport charges otherwise due an LEC, but also would permit the
interconnector to retain complete control over, and responsibility for, the
interconnection equipment. The interconnector would also be solely
responsible for monitoring, testing, maintenance, and repair expenses
associated with its collocated equipment. In addition, interconnectors would
pay fees for floor space, electricity, and other expenses directly resulting
from equipment being physically located on LEC premises. Thus, physical
collocation arrangements would clearly distinguish between LEC and
interconnectors' equipment and transmission facilities.
At least partially as a result of space availability inside LEC offices and
the safety and security aspects of allowing competitors' employees access to
LEC offices and facilities, an alternative to physical collocation has arisen.
With a virtual collocation arrangement, interconnectors would not have
access to LEC premises. Rather, the specific point of interconnection would
be a location adjacent to LEC offices, such as the nearest manhole or a
nearby office building. Despite the spatial separation of LEC and
interconnectors' equipment, virtual collocation prices should, in the FCC's
view, closely approximate those that would be applied to physical
collocation
57
arrangements including minimum, if any, transport charges.
Although IXCs should be expected to take full advantage of collocation
opportunities, CAPs have been the primary petitioners for regulatory rules
to define collocation and to clarify the prices, terms, and conditions which
would govern such arrangements.58 On the following page, Figure 3
illustrates a CAP network configuration with collocation.
This diagram represents physical collocation since the CAP's equipment
is located in the LEC's local serving office. A diagram of virtualcollocation
would be essentially identical, except that the box representing CAP
equipment would be located just outside the LEC local serving office.
Figure 3 depicts a situation in which LEC special access service is partially
displaced by CAP collocation. For those customer locations (buildings) lying
outside the scope of the CAP network (ring), special access circuits are
routed through LEC local serving offices (LSOs). In the case where two
LSOs are involved, the LEC would initially impose a CT charge to recover
56. LEC prices therefore do not reflect the likelihood that the costs of providing access
services in highly concentrated urban business districts are lower than the costs of serving more
remote, sparsely populated, lower traffic volume rural areas. Furthermore, volume discounts
are currently not included in FCC regulatory treatment of LECs.
57. Expanded Interconnection NPRMINOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259 1 20.
58. See, e.g., Metropolitan FiberSystems Petition, supra note 7.
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the costs of providing that portion of the circuit linking the customer building
to the LSO; CM charges would be imposed to recover the costs of spanning
the distance between the LSOs; finally, a second CT charge would apply to
the portion of the circuit connecting the IXCs' premises to the LEC's office.
Alternatively, a collocated CAP (represented by the shaded areas inside the
LSOs in the diagram) could connect to the customer's circuit at the LSO
serving the customer and provide a link between the LSO and the CAP's
network. The CAP would be assessed some, presumably small, interconnection charge by the LEC, designated by "?" in the diagram. The CAP,
however, would substitute its own services and prices for what were formerly
the LEC CM and second CT charges. In the case where only one LEC
office is involved in providing special access service to an end user, the CAP
could, through a collocation arrangement, offer its services and prices to end
users as an alternative to the LEC CT charge imposed on the provision of the
link between the LSO and an IXC POP. From the viewpoint of the LEC,
an interconnection charge assessed to the CAP would replace what had been
a CT charge paid by the IXC. The same results could be affected by virtual
collocation arrangements, with the possibility that the interconnection charges
might be different, but not necessarily so, from those that could govern
physical collocation arrangements.
However, under virtual collocation arrangements, ownership of
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interconnection equipment and expenses associated with such equipment are
less clearly defined than under physical collocation arrangements. For
example, all interconnection equipment required for virtual collocation
conceivably would be owned or leased by the LEC. The LEC would then
be responsible for the installation and maintenance of this equipment and thus
could potentially be held liable for transmission failures by interconnectors.
Perhaps because it recognizes these issues, the FCC has tentatively concluded
that interconnectors should be able to monitor and control the circuits that
terminate in LEC offices subject to virtual collocation arrangements." To
accomplish this, interconnectors will be permitted to specify performance
standards for interconnection equipment to detect service problems.
Interconnectors will also be able to reconfigure circuits to avoid service
degradation. Arriving at criteria to objectively assess whether performance
standards and LEC responses to interconnectors' demands are reasonable
promises to be a difficult regulatory or negotiating problem. Furthermore,
the issue of which types and even models of interconnection equipment (if
there is a difference in preference between LECs and interconnectors) will
satisfy virtual collocation requests could be settled either by negotiation or
regulatory mandate. Thus, the terms and conditions governing collocation
arrangements, especially virtual collocation, are unlikely to be settled simply
or straightforwardly.'
IV. CAPs' COLLOCATION INCENTIVES

To compete effectively in those segments of the interexchange access
market that lie beyond the scope of their existing networks, CAPs are
actively seeking authority to collocate their transmission equipment in LEC
local switching offices. By collocating equipment in a LEC central office,
a CAP can aggregate individual private lines coming into that central office
from widely divergent customer locations and supply transport service from
that central office to those customers' designated IXC long distance
networks. Thus, collocation would presumably encourage CAPs to build
facilities (e.g., fiber optic cable) connecting any or all LEC local switching
offices in a city to IXCs' POPs. While their initial focus has been on
providing dedicated, private line services, CAPs have strong economic
incentives to provide transport services for all telecommunications traffic,

59. Expanded Interconnection NPRM/NOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259 23.
60. While virtual collocation arrangements exist in a few state jurisdictions, CAPs have
generally presented arguments to the FCC that physical collocation is superior. In particular,
MFS alleges that virtual collocation would provide opportunities for LECs to retard CAP
network upgrades and improvements by delaying (and potentially increasing the cost of)
equipment replacement. See Comments of Metropolitan Fiber Systems, Inc., Expanded
Interconnection NPRM/NOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259, at 31-35 (filed August 6, 1991). In addition,
Teleport claims that in its experience "actual [physical] collocation is much less complex than
virtual collocation." Comments of Teleport Communications Group, Expanded Interconnection
NPRM/NOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259, at 10 (filed August 6, 1991).
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including switched toll calls as well as private lines, between LEC central
offices where they are collocated and IXC POPs.
Thus, the CAPs desire entry into the local exchange market as suppliers
of transport services for the portion of long distance calls that typically
traverse the LECs' networks for origination or termination. The incentives
motivating CAPs' desire to expand in the local transport market are derived
to some extent from current regulatory methods for establishing LEC local
transport service prices. Although CAPs' network deployment decisions can
be based on numerous factors, the likelihood of financial success is a primary
factor motivating any decision to invest in a new business venture. While
CAPs claim their provision of "disaster recovery" service, immediate
response to customer service requests, and constant monitoring to assure
network quality give them a competitive advantage over LECs, CAPs' entry
decisions are likely heavily influenced by a perception that economic profits
are being captured by the incumbent LECs in the interexchange access
market. Market entry appears particularly attractive when prevailing prices
are recognized as substantially in excess of the direct costs of providing
service.
LEC local transport prices are generally based on the average cost of
providing access services throughout the LEC's franchised territory within
each state. In addition, some portion of LEC fixed, joint, and common costs
are allocated to the provision of IXC access services. Thus, LEC access
prices are established to recover the average, fully distributed cost of
providing IXC access services." To the extent that the incremental or
marginal costs of providing access to IXC toll networks in major metropolitan areas are lower than LECs' average, fully distributcd costs, LEC access
prices in large urban areas will be significantly above the relevant marginal
cost of service. If CAPs collocate transmission equipment in LEC local
serving offices, they will presumably be assessed an interconnection charge
that is lower than prevailing LEC local transport and channel termination
rates. As a result, CAPs would be able to offer transport services to IXCs
to carry traffic between LEC central offices and POPs at prices below those
in LEC tariffs, yet high enough to maintain profitable operations.62
Thus, a key element in the CAPs' strategy to enter the local transport
market is a restructuring of LEC tariffs such that only parts of LEC access
services need be purchased by CAPs. Collocation is perceived as a method
by which interconnection to LEC central office equipment designed to
aggregate private line circuits and switched access minutes can be achieved
for a very low price. However, collocation does not seem to be driven

61. The rules concerning the computation of LEC interstate access charges are detailed in 47

C.F.R. §§ 69.105-.113 (1991).
62. For example, suppose CAPs are less efficient suppliers of transport services than LECs.
In this case, a CAP's marginal cost would be higher than an LEC's. However, if the LEC's

tariffed price is sufficiently higher than its marginal cost, a CAP could set its price below the
LEC's price but still significantly above its own marginal cost.
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primarily by technological or network architecture concerns. LECs currently
provide high capacity private line service between central offices and
customer locations at tariffed prices. Such facilities are obviously in place
to transport interexchange toll traffic to IXCs. Furthermore, central office
equipment designed to aggregate numerous individual private lines or large
volumes of switched access minutes and to transport these aggregated
services over high capacity dedicated facilities to IXC POPs is in place and
working today. Finally, two diversely routed dedicated circuits can be
installed from each LEC local switching office to each IXC POP at prices
determined by tariffs and/or special construction policies. Thus, collocation
of CAP equipment in LEC central offices is not a technological prerequisite
for IXCs' obtaining the types of services offered by CAPs.
V. COMPETITION ON THE MERITS AND CREAMSKIMMING DISTINGUISHED

Generally, competition between firms can produce several benefits, such
as lower prices for consumers, product innovation, and improved product
quality. However, enlarging the number of participants serving a market will
not necessarily result in workable competition, lower prices to consumers,
or improvements in economic efficiency. Whether these benefits will accrue
depends largely on industry cost conditions, demand conditions, the existence
of various regulatory public policy goals, and the methods regulatory
agencies adopt to achieve their goals. Other important factors include the
sunk costs incurred by incumbent firms that shoulder obligations to serve,
markets characterized by rapid technological change, regulatory depreciation
policies, and open entry policies that allow firms to take advantage of
production methods that incorporate advanced technologies while choosing
to enter only selected portions of the market. In short, policies designed to
increase the number of suppliers in a market will not always result in
fostering earnest price competition on the merits.
This section discusses the conditions under which workable competition
can be achieved when regulated firms are faced with entry by alternative
suppliers. This discussion includes the role of costs in the determination of
optimal industry structure, the economic concept of creamskimming, and the
related concept of sustainability in the context of the policy goal of fostering
workable competition. This discussion also serves as background for Section
VI, which presents an argument that the benefits of collocation policies are
as yet unclear.
A. The Role of Costs in Industry Structure
This section provides background material on the relationship between
the cost structures of firms operating in the marketplace and the industry
structure that would prevail if the market operated efficiently. These
economic concepts are relevant for public policy because they provide a
framework for determining what entry policies and pricing flexibility policies
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will most be in the public interest. These topics are then discussed in more
detail in the section that follows on creamskimmer entry and the important
economic concept of sustainability of natural monopoly.
To completely understand market structure, one must understand that
market structure, for the most part, results from the interactions between the
determinants offirm size and the size of the market. The former is defined
by the cost conditions of the firm(s) servicing the market, but the latter
results from market demand conditions. The interaction of these determinants places bounds on the structure of the industry (i.e., limits the number
and influences the size distribution of firms likely to be observed in the
industry).'
Given technological cost characteristics and market demand conditions,
a market is structurally competitive if a large number of firms servicing the
market leads to a division of output that yields the lowest possible total
industry costs. Similarly, a structural natural monopoly occurs if only one
firm serving the market yields the lowest possible total industry costs.
Between these extremes, possibly only an oligopoly can lead to total industry
cost minimization.
The most basic economic rationale for the regulation of the prices of a
multiproduct firm is the existence of naturalmonopoly. Natural monopoly
occurs when a single firm is the most efficient provider of total output for an
entire market. If this cost condition prevails, then a market consisting of
only a single provider is the most efficient industry structure. Natural
monopoly, in and of itself, is not necessarily objectionable on public policy
grounds, because such an industry structure is the most efficient available.
Such single firm supply, however, can result in monopolistic pricing. In that
case, the role of regulation is to permit the most efficient industry structure,
yet regulate prices in a way which simulates the economic outcome of a
competitive market, if competition were feasible.' Thus, natural monopoly

63. John C. Panzar, Technological Determinants of Firm and Industry Structure, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3, 33 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989).
64. This is essentially the public interest theory of regulation, which states that regulation
should be based on the maxim of economic efficiency. Thus, under this standard, regulation
should maximize social welfare through proper pricing and entry policies. Social welfare in this
context refers to the joint maximization of consumer surplus and the profits of the firms
servicing the market (i.e., producer surplus). In general, the public interest theory of regulation,
synthesized by Stigler, is a normative standard-i.e., it describes what regulation ought to be
rather than what it is. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
3 (1971). See also MICHAEL WATERSON, REGULATION OF THE FIRM AND NATURAL MONOPOLY

6-7 (1988). Hence, though it is a valuable benchmark with which one can prescribe economicbased regulatory policies, it does little to explain the actual behavior of regulators in practice,
who often have considerations besides economics. Essentially its primary goal is to protect
consumers against the abuses of market power, which is defined here as the ability of a firm (or
group of firms acting in concert) to increase prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time before either competitive entry or the actions of existing rivals require the
increase in price to be rescinded. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981). Similarly, the FCC defines market power
as the ability to control price in the marketplace. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
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cost conditions are not economically objectionable. It is monopoly pricing
that is economically wasteful, not the cost conditions that permitted it.
Three other economic concepts are useful to this discussion. An industry
configurationis a number of firms, and the associated levels of sales for each
firm, which together totally supply market demand at the prevailing prices.
For example, if there is just one firm which supplies all of the market
demand for a given product, that industry configuration is natural monopoly.
In contrast, if there are 100 firms that each supply a commensurately small
share of the market, the industry configuration is competitive. An industry
configuration is termed feasible if the firms involved in the industry can at
least break even. An industry configuration is termed efficient if that
configuration supplies the output the market demands at minimum cost.'
The key concept in using firm cost characteristics and market demand
conditions to make inferences about the optimal market structure is minimum
efficient scale. Essentially, minimum efficient scale (MES) is the smallest
level of output at which an average cost curve attains its minimum. The
relationship of MES with the overall industry demand curve is what defines
the best market structure for a given industry.'
Thus, the standard economic practice of making inferences about
industry structure from the relative positions of the market demand curve and
the average cost curves of relevant firms provides analytic tools useful in
evaluating policies designed to foster competition. Economic theory indicates
that an industry may have feasible configurations that involve either just a
few or a large number of suppliers. All this really says is that beyond a
certain number of firms, any new entrants may have great difficulty in
garnering positive profits. The market may only be large enough for a
certain number of suppliers. This, of course, depends on many variables in
real industrial markets, such as the ability of new entrants to alter the
industry demand curve with their marketing plans, and the strategic
interaction of firms in the way they compete via pricing. Economic theory
also holds that of all the feasible industry configurations, some will be
efficient but some will not. Thus, one cannot infer that having a very large
number of firms serving the market will automatically engender efficiency,
and hence lead to lower prices for customers. A feasible and efficient
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1980) (First
Report and Order).
65. Panzar, supra note 63, at 33-38.
66. For example, if there was one firm for which MES were to coincide with total market
demand, then the most efficient industry structure is natural monopoly, for no collection of two
or more firms could supply the industry at lower cost. If, on the other hand, there were 100
firms, all of which exhibited MES ofjust one percent of total industry demand, and these firms
collectively supplied the industry at least cost, then the most efficient market structure is a
competitive market. It is possible, of course, that industry demand could be satisfied most
efficiently by one large firm with a relatively large MES, combined with several smaller firms
whose efficiencies are exhausted at much smaller levels of output. A detailed exposition of the
complicated conditions required to produce these results is beyond the scope of this article. Id.
at 35-38.
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industry configuration may involve only a small number of firms. Further,
an industry "shake-up," in which several marginal firms exit the industry,
is not automatically inimical to public policy. Again, that the feasible and
efficient industry configuration involves just a few firms is entirely possible.
The relevance of these concepts to the FCC's proposed plans regarding
collocation and competition in the interexchange access market is that
regulatory policies aimed at fostering competition should have as the
underlying objective achieving the industry configuration that is not only
feasible, but also efficient. A policy should seek to encourage competition
only if the feasible efficient industry configuration is a competitive market
and there are impediments to competition taking root. Public policy is not
automatically improved by increasing the number of industry participants.
If industry cost and demand conditions dictate that a competitive market is
neither feasible nor efficient, seeking to create such a market structure can
only reduce economic efficiency.
Clearly, going from the theoretical extreme of a single supplier to
another, equally feasible industry configuration involving more firms is easier
than going from a single supplier industry configuration to a feasible,
efficient industry configuration.67 Thus, if policymakers implicitly define
a competitive industry simply as one in which there are many firms allowed
to serve the market, it is quite possible that such policies could cause the
industry configuration to go from a relatively efficient one (involving perhaps
just one or a few firms) to an inefficient one that involves many more
suppliers (who collectively do not cause a reduction in total industry costs).
On the other hand, if all the relevant facts about market demand and costs
were known, a feasible and efficient industry configuration for the
interexchange access market could very possibly emerge from the integration
of the LECs' and the CAPs' networks. Measuring or collecting the data
needed to render a scientific determination of this is simply not possible,
however. All one can infer at this time is that a greater number of firms in
the interexchange access market may either reduce or improve economic
efficiency. The former point is, of course, most important here, for
policymakers appear to have largely assumed that only the latter can result.
B. Creamskimming
Creamskimming is a valid issue whenever markets serviced by
incumbent, regulated firms are made subject to entry by other suppliers.
67. The former involves simply redistributing the monopolist's market among several firms;
the latter, however, involves redistributing the monopolist's market among a group of firms
which collectively supply the market at lower cost than the monopolist did. If this same
monopolist is a natural monopoly (which by definition makes it the most efficient industry
supplier), then clearly the former is possible, but the latter is not. Admittedly, this is an
application of static analysis to a topic that may be quite dynamic in nature. The accurate
application of a dynamic analysis to this topic is beyond the scope of this article, and
paradoxically, may lack some of the important insights afforded by examining static concepts.
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Creamskimming has been discussed in several FCC dockets' and in several
state public utility commissions' orders.' Essentially, if regulatory policies

68. Fortunately, most FCC orders seem to have used this concept in an economically
responsible manner. See, e.g., In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration
of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public
Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of
the Commission's Rules, 24 F.C.C.2d 318, 332-34 (1970) (Notice of Inquiry to Formulate
Policy, Notice of Proposed Rulemnking) (rejecting the creamskimming argument); In re
Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide Specialized
Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service and
Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Commission's Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 870,
914-15 (1971) (First Report and Order) (again rejecting the creamskimming argument leveled
against new entrants to the markets for point-to-point microwave radio service); In re the
Applications of Cities Service Oil Co. for Authority to Construct an Earth Station on a Drilling
Platform in the Gulf of Mexico; Western Union Telegraph Co. for Section 214 Authority to
Provide Domestic Satellite Communication Services to Offshore Drilling Platforms and for
Authority to Construct Additional Transmitters at its Glenwood, N.J. and Cedar Hill, Tex. Earth
Stations, 51 F.C.C.2d 653, 664-67 (1975) (Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Authorization)
(rejecting the creamskimmer argument raised by Offshore Telephone Company in its petition that
prospective competitor Western Union be restricted from establishing channels of communication
for the provision of domestic satellite communications services to offshore drilling platforms);
In re International Communications Policies Governing Designation of Recognized Private
Operating Agencies, Grants of IRUs in International Facilities and Assignment of Data Network
Identification Codes, 95 F.C.C.2d 627, 646 n.27 (1983) (Notice of Inquiry) (rejecting the
argument that non-carrier cable indefeasible rights of users (IRUs) are a form of
creamskimming, arguing that incumbent carriers have downward pricing flexibility and do not
have sunk costs, making them able to sell idled circuits). One order in which the concept seems
to have been misused is In re American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Long Lines Department,
Revisions of Tariff F.C.C. No. 260, Private Line Services, Series 5000 (Telpak), 20 F.C.C.2d
383, 391 (1969) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (N. Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting)
(characterizing Bell's request to offer the lower Telpak tariffs in areas where there is entry by
alternative suppliers as "'creanskimming' its own market in terms of its selection of locations
and facilities for providing service").
69. The use of the crearskimmer concept by the state PUCs appears not to have led to
irresponsible regulatory decisions. In re Investigation into Equal Access Exchange Areas, Toll
Monopoly Areas, 1 + Restriction to the Local Exchange Companies and Elimination of the
Access Discount, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 473, 486-87 (Fla. PSC 1990) (continuing to
reserve I + intraLATA traffic for the LECs, arguing that IXCs could otherwise recruit
high-volume toll users, those most suitable to WATS customers, via creamskimming); In re
Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Supply and Capacity, 110 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 486, 538
(Cal. PUC 1990) ("We continue to believe that unrestricted entry of interstate pipelines into
California for the purpose of 'creamskimming' major industrial customers does significant harm
to remaining captive customers."); In re Customer-Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone
Companies Pursuant to I.C. 8-1-2.6, et seq., 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 366, 380 (Ind.
URC 1989) (commenting on the prospect of creamskimming of the smaller LEC's CSO market
by the larger LECs, but rejecting it); In re Competition for Intrastate Interexehange Telecommunications Services, 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 346, 373-74 (Conn. DPUC 1989) (rejecting
that the deleterious effects of competition in the toll market, i.e., increases in the rates for basic
local exchange service, are likely to take place, and proposing that "a contribution from carrier
access services could be derived to replace most, if not all of that which would be lost with the
advent of competition"); In re Regulation of Pay Telephone Equipment, 88 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 263, 283 (Ind. PSC 1987) (Commissioner O'Lessker, dissenting) (Creanskimming in the
market for coin-operated pay telephone (COPT) service is inimical to the public interest: "The
pricing advantage that COPT owners may gain from their freedom from certain regulatory
constraints would not be of great concern if it were not for the fact that revenues lost to the
LECs through unequal competition will have to be made up elsewhere in the rate structure. Once
again, I am at a loss to understand how this can be helpful to the ratepayers."). Further, the
Florida Public Service Commission used the prospect of creamskimming by IXCs to maintain
entry restrictions for the intrastate intraLATA toll market, arguing in part that the abolition of
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induce entry by creamskimmers, the public interest may be harmed
substantially. If, however, suppliers that are at least as efficient as the
incumbent regulated firms enter the market, public policies can be crafted so
as to harness these efficiencies while not harming either the continuance of
benefitted service provision or common carrier obligations with which the
incumbent firm is charged.'
In general, creamskimming involves an incumbent regulated firm
charged with servicing several markets and new entrants able to selectively
choose entry into only the most lucrative market segments, leaving the
largely unremunerative markets to the incumbent. Creamskimming is
therefore relevant when the incumbent firm, due to common carrier obligations, must serve unremunerative markets (which may involve the receipt of
cross-subsidies from other services) and markets in which prices are
significantly above marginal costs (a price-cost relationship that is required
to provide the cross-subsidies to the unremunerative, benefitted market).
Hence, there is cream in the form of regulated prices that markedly exceed
marginal costs and there is the process of skimming, consisting of the
selective entry.
Not all entry is creamskimming. The creamskimmer is a firm that may
actually be less efficient than the incumbent, but which can still earn profits
from servicing the market in which prices significantly exceed marginal cost.
The creamskimmer is allowed open, selective entry to the "cream" market,
while the incumbent must adhere to exit barriers and obligations to serve, as
well as maintain the cross-subsidies from the cream market to the benefitted
market. In economic terms, creamskimming is more likely the less flexible
so-called toll monopoly areas would allow the IXCs to creamskim the most profitable, high
volume routes while leaving the LECs with the obligation to provide uniform service to all
customers and to average rates statewide in order to ensure relatively inexpensive local service
to all customers. Florida PSC Order No. 16343, issued July 14, 1986. The maintenance of the
toll monopoly areas, based on the creamskimmer argument and on the other arguments
advanced, was affirmed by an appeals court in 1987. U.S. Sprint Communications Company
v. John R. Marks et al., 509 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
70. The economics literature has not dealt extensively with this topic. However, the available
writings offer much material valuable to the evaluation of public policy. See 2 ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 220-46 (2d ed. 1988); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean
Tirole, Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 1042, 1055 (1990); Mark
Zupan, On Cream Skimming, Coase, and the Sustainabilityof NaturalMonopolies, 22 APPLIED
ECON. 487 (1990); and Brock & Evans, supra note 2. More has been written on the related
topic of sustainability of natural monopoly, which is defined and discussed subsequently in
Section IV-C, supra. See William J. Baumol, et al., Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the
Sustainability of Prices in a Multiproduct Monopoly, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 350 (1977); John C.
Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J.
ECON. 1 (1977); John C. Panzar, Sustainability, Efficiency, and Vertical Integration, in
REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBIUC ENTERPRISE 171 (Paul Kleindorfer & Bridger M. Mitchell
eds., 1980); William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Cost, Sunk Cost, Entry Barriers and
Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q. J. ECON. 405 (1981); Kenneth Baseman, Sustainability and
the Entry Process, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 273 (Papers & Proceedings) (1981); WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL, Er AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 192-221
(1982); Thijs ten Raa, Resolution of Conjectures on the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 15
RAND J. ECON. 135 (1984); Michael Einhorn, Optimality and Sustainability: Regulation and
Intermodal Competition in Telecommunications, 18 RAND J. ECON. 550 (1987).
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the incumbent firm's prices and the smaller the level of sunk costs necessary
to enter the market.71 Conversely, creamskimming is unlikely when the
incumbent firm has considerable downward pricing flexibility, substantial
sunk costs are necessary to enter the market, or there are many entrants who
attempt to share in the fleeting profit opportunities created by any temporary
rigidity of the incumbent's prices.'
Thus, creamskimmer entry must, for public policy purposes, be distinguished from earnest competition on the merits, which involves lawful battles
for market share, and which, in turn, can involve the spirited offering of
prices that are lower than one's competitors for a service of the same quality,
the offering of greater quality of service for a given price, or both. This is
the essence of competition: doing better than one's rivals by dint of skill,
foresight, and industry. In competition, prices inform potential entrants
about the profits and costs of the incumbent carrier. High prices signal
excessive profits or excessive waste on the part of incumbents.
To help distinguish creamskimming from true competition, a useful
classification of entrants into regulated markets follows.73 Hit-and-run
entrants appear in markets in which incumbent firms are saddled with a
pricing rigidity requirement. These entrants take their profits and exit before
the incumbent meets their prices. The lower the entrants' sunk costs, and the
longer a competitive pricing response from the incumbent takes, the greater
are hit-and-run profits. Protected entrants, though perhaps inefficient, earn
profits because the incumbent firm has no downward pricing flexibility. In
contrast to both of these classifications, efficient entrantsearn profits because
they truly are more efficient than the incumbent firm, hence the incumbent's
competitive pricing responses, where possible, do not force the entrant to exit
the market. This method of classifying entrants allows one to distinguish
which types of entrants are inimical to the public interest, which are not, and
how public policy can be crafted so as to address inefficient market entry.
First, the first two types of firms, the hit-and-run entrants and the
protected entrants, are clearly the true creamskimmers. Entry into public
utility markets by these two types of firms reduces social welfare because
such entrants are prone to be less efficient than the incumbent, yet divert
business from it due to regulatory pricing policies, such as the lack of
downward pricing flexibility. Regulatory policies should discourage entry
by these types of firms. In contrast, the efficient entrants can increase social
welfare because they are as efficient or more efficient than the incumbent.
Even so, this type of entry should not be encouraged via simple open entry
policies, for such entry may still divert revenues the incumbent uses to
71. Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 63. Sunk costs are costs that cannot be avoided in the
short- or intermediate-run, even with a total cessation of output. Hence, they are the
unrecoverable portion of a given investment.
72. Id. at 68.
73. These three classifications are adapted from Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 69; and
KAHN, supra note 70, at 226.
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subsidize other services by regulatory mandate.74 Thus, regulatory activity
cannot be confined simply to encouraging open entry if the maintenance of
subsidies for benefitted services is a public policy goal. Instead, policy can
require that the efficient entrant supply the subsidized service itself, or pay
a de facto entry tax to help the incumbent replenish the lost subsidy
revenues.
In the face of hit-and-run entry or entry by protected entrants, the role
of downward pricing flexibility for the incumbent regulated firm cannot be
ignored as a necessary economic ingredient of sound public policy. Indeed,
creamskimmer entry would be effectively precluded by downward pricing
flexibility. Moreover, efficient entry can offer significant benefits to
customers if the incumbent firm can engage in lawful price competition,
contingent upon the availability of pricing flexibility.75
If, however, the regulated prices of the incumbent are kept too high and
too rigid, the economic welfare consequences can be quite negative. Under
these circumstances, the incumbent, despite the fact that it might be the most
efficient supplier, could be displaced by less efficient competitors. In theory,
the entire demand for the service in question could be diverted to less
efficient competitors. In this extreme case, not only would consumer
demand be driven below its economically efficient level, but this entire
demand would be satisfied by inefficient alternative suppliers. Under a free
entry regime, then, a regulated price that is rigidly held too high is especially
damaging, making downward pricing flexibility for the incumbent firm
especially important.76 The importance of this downward pricing flexibility
is emphasized in the next section, in which the economic concept of sustainability is discussed.

74. Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 69. If the maintenance of subsidies for benefitted
services is not taking place, then open entry policies for efficient entrants will foster efficiency
and not harm the public interest.
75. The importance of downward pricing flexibility in combination with expanded entry
policies was recognized by the California Public Utilities Commission ("California Commission") in approving a settlement in the initial phase of an investigation into the need for
modifications to the regulatory framework of local exchange carriers. The settlement permitted
LECs flexibility in downward pricing of certain services used primarily by businesses, and
allowed LECs and interexchange carriers to compete within LATAs in the provision of high
speed digital private line services. The California Commission ruled that allowing LECs pricing
flexibility while allowing IXCs to compete within LATAs for high speed digital private line
services would further the public interest in two significant ways: (1) customers would
experience rate reductions, and (2) greater pricing flexibility would enable the LECs to be more
competitive and attractive to larger business customers. Significantly, the California Commission
acknowledged that a LEC's loss of larger customers causes those customers who remain on the
system to bear the burden of supporting the system through higher rates for all services. See
Interim Opinion Adopting Modified Phase I Settlement in 1.87-11-033, CPUC Decision
1.87-11-033 (1988). See Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 67-68.
76. See Bruce C. Greenwald & William W. Sharkey, The Economics of Deregulation of
Local Exchange Telecommunications, I J. REG. ECON. 319, 333-34 (1989), for the basis of this
discussion.
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C. The Related Issue of Sustainability
In general, sustainability will be present if average costs fall as output
expands. If, however, average costs first fall and then rise with output
(resulting in a standard U-shaped average cost curve), then a firm can be a
natural monopoly yet not be sustainable.' Thus, sustainability theory paints
the following picture. The market is being served by a monopolist that must
choose a price and an output level such that (1) the chosen output is equal to
total market demand at the chosen price, (2) the revenues collected are equal
to the total cost of producing the chosen output, and (3) the monopolist is not
allowed to deviate from the chosen price (i.e., it has no pricing flexibility
except possibly with significant time lags) and is required to satisfy the
residual demand for the product at that price. This is very close to what is
observed in telecommunications markets for access services. Given this basic
scenario, no other firm would wish to enter the market if the monopolist
described here is sustainable.7'
The economic concept of sustainabilityis related to the creamskimming
issue. Sustainability analysis provides policymakers with additional tools for
evaluating the role that competition by rival firms should play in an industry
that is considered a natural monopoly. It assists in answering the question
whether there should be open and unrestricted entry into some or all of a
natural monopolist's markets. 79

Does increasing the number of firms supplying a market guarantee that
the market has somehow been improved? Does it ensure that the market will
go from being a monopoly to being competitive? The answer to each of
these questions is "no, not necessarily." Sustainability theory is what
provides the basis for this response. Essentially, under the technical
definitions of sustainability usually given in the economics literature, a
natural monopoly is sustainable if there is a price and a corresponding level
of output such that entry by rival firms is unattractive (i.e., prospective
entrants cannot earn positive profits by entering the market), while all
demand is satisfied and revenues cover total costs of production.'
If a
natural monopoly is not sustainable, however, then it cannot ward off
uninnovative entry, even though total industry costs are at a minimum when

77. Id. This describes the case in which the firm offers only one product. The multiproduct
case is much more complicated and does not lend itself well to a general exposition of the
concept. And see Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 69-76.
78. WILuAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 86-87 (1982).

79. This statement is not meant to imply that telecommunications consists of a natural
monopoly. The cost concept defining natural monopoly is that of subaddifivity, which states that
if a firm has a cost function that is subadditive, then it can produce at less cost than an) other
finn or collection of firms in the industry. The conditions that must be shown to exist to prove
that subadditivity (and hence natural monopoly) exists are sufficiently complicated that no
regulator can be entirely certain that the firm it regulates is a true natural monopoly.
80. SHARKEY, supra note 78, at 85.
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only a single supplier exists. The resulting prices and levels of output may
be inferior to the provision of industry output via natural monopoly.
Given the situation posed by the issue of collocation, introducing a
slightly different view of sustainability may be more useful. Within the
context of collocation and open entry policies, defining sustainability in terms
of a price that allows entry if and only if such entry lowers total industry
costs, rather than in terms of a price that deters entry, or that makes entry
by rival firms unattractive, may be more useful."
Regardless of the definition of sustainability employed, the concepts of
price sustainabilityand quantity sustainabilityalso need to be distinguished.
A monopoly is not price sustainable if it is not sustainable given price
rigidity. If a monopolist cannot easily and quickly revise its prices, other
firms can enter the market profitably and the monopolist must either become
insolvent because of revenue lost to the new entrants or somehow revise its
prices. If a monopoly is quantity sustainable, then a monopolist can maintain
the pre-entry level of output by changing its prices in the face of entry.
This, of course, requires a great deal of pricing flexibility. Thus, a
monopoly that is not price sustainable (i.e., will not continue long-term
production without a price revision) can still be quantity sustainable (i.e, can
maintain current production levels if its prices can move freely). In fact, in
markets in which sunk costs are considerable and variable costs are small,
the prospect of quantity sustainability is especially relevant for evaluating
entry.'
Thus, sustainability theory offers general guidelines for public policy.
First, a natural monopoly may not be sustainable. Hence, even if a firm can
offer its product at least cost to the industry, the market may still be subject
to entry." Under these circumstances, entry is potentially inimical to the
public interest, for it can encourage the appearance of inefficient firms while
simultaneously jeopardizing the financial viability of the incumbent
monopolist. Second, if a natural monopoly is sustainable, then entry will
only be observed if the entrants possess a superior technology.' Third,
81. This distinction was suggested by William Sharkey. See letter from William W. Sharkey
to Alexander C. Larson (Oct. 9, 1991) (on file with the authors).
82. This is so because in telecommunications markets, suppliers may change prices, but due
to common carrier obligation, are not usually allowed to adjust their quantities-they must serve
any and all customers who want the service. Given this constraint, which cannot be lifted, a
policymaker would want to examine if the market was quantity sustainable, whether an
incumbent firm can ward off uninnovative entry by maintaining current quantity levels (honoring
the common carrier obligation), but adjusting prices. See Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 74.
This analysis is developed in Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 71-76.
83. The issues of price sustainability versus quantity sustainability have not been developed
in the literature as far as competitive responses, and strategic pricing interactions of the firms
involved. Note, too, that under quantity sustainability, a firm can earn positive profits while
lawfully deterring entry.
84. This statement ignores considerations of a dynamically changing industry technology and
the necessity that the incumbent natural monopolist incur large amounts of sunk costs. This
scenario is extremely relevant to the discussion of CAP entry. The entry of CAPs may seem at
first glance to conform to the case in which entrants are more efficient, when in fact it is a case
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considerable pricing flexibility is required as a public policy tool if socially
beneficial entry is to be encouraged, for a firm that is not price sustainable,
due largely to a forced rigidity of prices, may, in fact, be quantity sustainable. Considerable pricing flexibility is required if quantity sustainability is
to be achieved where price sustainability is likely not attainable.
Further, sustainability applies to the situation in which, by virtue of sunk
costs,' monopoly suppliers may be vulnerable to opportunistic behavior on
the part of other firms that do not have the same obligation to serve the
entire market, and that have the ability to choose the latest technology. This
can be particularly problematic if the industry experiences continuous
technological advancement. If production requires a firm to incur relatively
large sunk costs, and the industry is a growing market with economies of
scale or continuous technological advancement, the threat of entry by
competitors merely choosing the latest technology and selectively serving
segments of the market may be particularly challenging for policymakers.
To satisfy market demand, the incumbent monopoly firm must build enough
capacity to serve total anticipated market demand. This requires a commitment to investment in plant of a given vintage or a given scale, which likely
requires incurring sunk costs. Before this plant can be depreciated fully,
however, pressure could arise from customers wishing to purchase services
from vendors boasting the latest technology. Thus, in a dynamic market, in
which technology is rapidly changing, a natural monopoly with sunk costs
may be inherently unsustainable.8 6
At the heart of this issue is the asymmetry of the regulatory process in
which the regulated incumbent firm might be required to invest sunk costs
in a plant that cannot be fully depreciated in a technologically dynamic
market. The usual story, from which these observations are taken, is one of
opportunistic behavior by entrants when there are sunk costs. In an
unregulated setting, this possibility gives an incentive for either vertical
integration or the use of long term contracts.' In terms of public policy,
a far sighted regulatory agency could offer the same advantages to an
incumbent regulated firm." Thus, a case of dynamic non-sustainability is
properly considered a case of regulatory failure. 9

in which the incumbent firm has incurred significant sunk costs to provide its service, and
entrants who use more advanced technologies (and are not obligated to serve the entire market)
are able to enter and earn positive profits. This is the ease of dynamic nonsustainability.
85. Sunk costs are costs that are unavoidable even with a total cessation of output, and hence
constitute the proportion of costs that have no salvage value once incurred.
86. SHARKEY, supra note 78, at 149.
87. These devices reduce the risks of sunk costs. Long term contracts lock in customers
whose revenue covers the sunk costs. Vertical integration allows for more diversified products
given the same sunk costs.
88. Such advantages include methods by which sunk costs could reasonably be recovered,
but efficient entry is encouraged.
89. These latter key points are due to Sharkey. See letter from William W. Sharkey to
Alexander C. Larson, supra note 81.
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D. The Optimal Regulatory Handling of the Creamskimmer Problem
The optimal regulation of entry to preclude the creamskimmer problem
should (1) ensure that output is produced by the most efficient firm or firms
and therefore at least cost to society, and (2) maintain a continuous supply
of services deemed essential by society. Thus, one policy that has been
suggested for handling creamskimmer entry is, in economic terms, the use
of a de facto entry tax. In other words, regulatory policy could simultaneously encourage socially beneficial entry, discourage socially wasteful
creamskimmer entry, and maintain subsidies to socially desirable but
unprofitable services by requiring entrants to replenish the cream they skim
from profitable public utility markets. Essentially, entrants would pay a
surcharge serving the role of an entry tax, which would theoretically screen
inefficient entrants (who by definition cannot post positive profits by entering
when the tax is added to their costs), but allow efficient entrants (who can
still post profits, and offer lower prices to consumers in the process) without
eroding socially desirable subsidies.'
Given reliable estimates of the subsidies required from above-cost
services, a surcharge could be straightforwardly devised that could simultaneously prevent creamskimming, ensure the availability of revenues that
could be used to maintain desirable subsidies, and permit efficient innovative
competitors into the market. Such a surcharge method would be better than
entry restrictions if regulators thought that significant low-cost entrants
exist.9' The question is whether, in the context of the interexchange access
market, the surcharge itself is feasible. The subsidy flow from LEC services
also offered by the CAPs probably cannot be estimated with any reliability,
and determining where these subsidy flows end up going is most certainly not
possible. Thus, this method may be extremely difficult to use within the
context of this market.
The literature has yielded other methods as well, and some may be as
promising as the surcharge method. For example, Zupan has suggested that
natural monopolies previously presumed to be nonsustainable can be
invulnerable to creamskimmer entry if side payments and bargaining between

90. This discussion and analysis is due to Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 81-84. Brock and
Evans cite Hunt as the originator of this idea, though other economists have built upon it. See
Carl Ellis Hunt, Jr., Competition in Telecommunications: A Surcharge as a Method to Promote
Competition in PrivateLines Services (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado
(Boulder)).
91. This was the approach of the Connecticut DPUC in a 1989 order addressing competition
in the intrastate long distance market: "SNET is directed to include within its rate structure a
proposed contribution element and should include an investigation into the feasibility of the
application of a surcharge as a possible source of the contribution." Id. In re Competition for
Intrastate Interexchange Telecommunications Services, 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 346, 380
(Conn. DPUC 1989). The DPUC proposed that "a contribution from carrier access services
could be derived to replace most, if not all of that which would be lost with the advent of
competition." Id. at 374.
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This method may be feasible in
firms and consumers are possible.'
discussing the less technologically complicated cable television market, but
is not a real option for a market as complicated as the interexchange access
market. Other methods have been suggested by Einhorn and by Laffont and
Tirole. These authors suggest, for example, the use of nonuniform tariffs
(i.e., pricing schedules that do not necessarily offer the same marginal price
for each unit of output, such as a volume discount) in which some of the
usage of high-use customers is priced below marginal cost.'e Thus, the
economics literature has produced several theoretical ways in which entry can
be handled besides entry proscriptions.
Still another consideration is the carrier-of-last-resort argument advanced
originally by Kahn.9a Essentially, this argument is that some entrants may
only be viable because the incumbent firm must serve as the carrier-of-lastresort in the event that the entrant's facilities produce a service disruption.
Stated another way, the incumbent's customers must recover, through the
prices they pay, the additional network capacity required to provide such free
back-up service to the entrant. Kahn characterized this situation as one in
which entry may well constitute creamskimming, but creamskimming with
the effect of introducing internal subsidization where none existed before-essentially the subsidization of the entrant's customers by the
incumbent's captive customers being forced to carry a disproportionate share
of the back-up capacity costs. 95 The economic remedy for this situation is
known as a default capacity tariff, where the entrant pays fees to the
incumbent based on the incremental cost of the back-up capacity required.'

92. Zupan, supra note 70, at 490.
93. Laffont & Tirole, supra note 70; and Einhorn, supra note 70. Note that while there are
several models in which optimal non-linear pricing involved prices below marginal costs for
large users, all of these models involve somewhat special assumptions about the nature of bypass
technology. In both the Laffont-Tirole model and the Einhom model, bypass technology is
assumed to be potentially more efficient for large users but that non-linear pricing can be used
only for the regulated customers. Einhorn's model is based on full information, while the
Laffont-Tirole model produces an incentive compatibility result with imperfect information.
Also, note that standard incentive models, in which the same technology is used for both large
and small customers, yield optimal prices equal to, but not below marginal cost for large
customer types.
94. KAHN, supra note 70, at 236-39.
95. Id. at 239.
96. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Dennis L.
Weisman, Default Capacity Tariffs: Smoothing the TransitionalRegulatory Asymmetries in the
Telecommunications Market, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1988). A default capacity tariff is a tariff
used to charge for the maintenance of back-up capacity required by companies that elect to
bypass the local exchange carriers. Specifically, facility bypassers would pay flat rate default
capacity charges to ensure the availability of back-up capacity in the event of system failure or
overflow during periods of peak utilization. These tariffs could be levied on a flat rate basis,
much like insurance premiums, because capacity costs are incurred independently of usage
levels, though admittedly it is difficult to design such tariffs.
Default capacity tariffs have been used in other industries, and can offer several benefits
if implemented properly. First, they can reduce cross-subsidies that flow from general customers
to facility bypassers. Second, they can enhance universal service more consistently with the
coming new environment, in which local service franchises may not necessarily guarantee the
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E. Summary
This section presented the economic theory relevant to examining the
basic assumption implicit in the FCC's NPRM/NOI on expanded interconnection (i.e., that increasing the number of sellers in a market will automatically lead to the same benefits to consumers that competition on the merits
does). While competition is in some circumstances theoretically possible in
natural monopoly markets, there are limits to the viability of competition in
such markets. Open entry policies cannot ignore the potential for creamskimming and should not be blind to the particular combination of sunk
costs, obligations to serve, and rapid technological change affecting the
operations of incumbent firms. Further, such policies should also not be
blind to the need for downward pricing flexibility on the part of incumbent
firms if economic efficiency is to be fostered. And finally, industry cost
conditions indicate that open entry policies may very possibly cause a
transition to an industry structure in which there are several more suppliers,
all of whom earn positive profits, but who collectively do not yield a
decrease in total industry costs, and hence do not yield an increase in
economic efficiency.
VI. THE LONG TERM BENEFITS OF COLLOCATION ARE UNCLEAR

Collocation policies can generate expectations of accelerating the spread
of competition throughout the entire local exchange market. The benefits
usually cited as flowing from competitive markets are presumably expected
to appear after implementing a collocation policy. However, it is not certain
that widespread social and economic benefits will necessarily accompany a
regulatory policy intended to strengthen CAPs' market position.
A. Collocation Might Increase the Number of Suppliers
Without Increasing Competition
Regulators should act to ensure that competition will emerge via the
CAPs' participation in the interexchange access market, not merely entry.
As presented in the preceding section, the two concepts must be distinguished
for purposes of public policy. Earnest competition on the merits involves
lawful battles for market share. In contrast to competition, creamskimming
involves firms which have chosen to serve a specialized portion of a market
by virtue of regulatory policies requiring prices based on average cost
figures, the deregulation of entry but not pricing, and a lack of downward

revenue streams observed in the past. Third, they can encourage efficient utilization of the
network, since they allow for reciprocal sharing of network capacity between facility bypassers
and residential and small business customers. Id. at 177-78.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

35

California Western Law Review, Vol. 28 [1991], No. 2, Art. 4

298

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

pricing flexibility for the incumbent regulated firms.' Creamskimming is
competition turned on its head. In creamskimming, prices misinform; high
prices mean high cross subsidies for low priced services. In competition,
entrants promote social welfare by expanding output, lowering costs, and
eliminating excessive profits or excessive waste. In creamskimming, entrants
promote social waste, because they are prone to be less efficient and less
innovative than the incumbent, and can disrupt socially desirable pricing."8
The market for interexchange access is either a natural monopoly or it
is not. If it is, then regulation on the upper limits of prices is required in
conjunction with entry restrictions. If this market's cost characteristics make
it a natural monopoly, then the market will only sustain one producer of
optimum low-cost size. Stated another way, true competition within such a
market is impossible, and allowing entrants to service the market leads to
wasteful duplication. If, on the other hand, this market is not a natural
monopoly, then competition within the market is possible, entry restrictions
need not be maintained, curbs on the upper limits of prices are not needed,
and unlimited downward pricing flexibility should be granted to all firms
selling in the marketplace, including the LECs.
Nobody really knows if large LECs are true natural monopolies.
Statistical studies in the economics literature test for this phenomenon, with
extremely mixed results. All such studies necessarily use simplistic models
which make the results questionable? In general, it is not a simple matter
to perform a study of whether a telephone company is a natural monopoly
or not, as such studies require a large amount of data that are difficult or
impossible to obtain, require expensive econometric models, and are rather
restrictive in the structure that allows them to address the problem in the first
place.
The fact that nobody really knows if the interexchange access market is
a natural monopoly constitutes the well known "Catch-22" of economic
regulation: telephone companies are regulated because it is feared that they
are natural monopolies, yet the only practical test of whether they are natural
monopolies is simply to deregulate them and see what happens to the industry

97. Commissioner Duggan speaks of the eventuality of creamskimming in his Separate
Statement. Expanded Interconnection NPRM/NOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 4359 (separate statement of
Commissioner Ervin S. Duggan, at 1) [hereinafter Duggan]. If competition and its benefits to
consumers are the Commission's public policy goals in this docket, then true competition should
be encouraged and made possible, whereas crearnskimmer entry should be avoided.
98. Brock & Evans, supra note 2, at 63.
99. An important survey of these studies may be found in Melvyn A. Fuss, A Survey of
Recent Results in the Analysis of Production Conditions in Telecommunications, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Ldon Courville, et al. eds.,
1983). A more recent survey may be found in Ferene Kiss & Bernard Lefebvre, Econometric
Models of Telecommunications Firms: A Survey, 38 REVUE ECONOMIQUE 307 (1987). And see
SHARKEY, supra note 78, at 197-205; JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY RATES 602-06 (1988); Panzar, supra note 62, at 51-55; and, Lars R6ller, Proper
Quadratic Cost Functions with an Application to the Bell System, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 202
(1990).
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structure.°
The point being made here is this: it is not a foregone conclusion that the
existence of CAPs constitutes true competition on the merits, hence it is not
a foregone conclusion that consumers will necessarily receive the full benefits
competition normally would produce for them. The FCC may have
concluded too readily that the furtherance of the CAPs will automatically
stimulate workable competition and lead to the benefits such competition
normally would yield. If no downward pricing flexibility is afforded the
LECs, the conclusion is beyond premature, it is a ticket to regulatory failure.
True competition indeed is unlikely to be achieved by the removal of only
one of the barriers to effective competition, that of entry. The barrier of
regulatory pricing restrictions that prevents incumbents from pricing their
services according to market demand conditions must also fall before true
competition can arise.
Beyond rigidly set prices, the LECs also must shoulder the responsibility
of being the "carrier of last resort," and in any case must offer network
ubiquity. 1 ' These two responsibilities alone mean that not all components
of the LECs' network can instantly incorporate the latest technology.
Further, if rate of return regulation did, in fact, lead to distortions in
investment behavior and technology choice, LECs might be expected, or
even required, to maintain vintage network equipment. Given this and the
lack of entry restrictions, CAPs may quite easily enter the market and
employ technologies that are more advanced, and hence lower cost, than
what the LECs employ in various parts of their networks (e.g., deploying
fiber optic cable versus retaining copper wire to furnish special access
service). CAPs need only wait for technological advances to supersede the
current level of technology embedded in LEC operations, and then step in to
offer their selected piece of the network, but nothing else, with no common
carrier obligation or requirement of network ubiquity. Further, such new
entrants have unlimited downward pricing flexibility, whereas the LECs thus
far have none, making it relatively easy to use new technology to wangle a
piece of the network pie.
The key question for public policy purposes then becomes whether the
process just described above is true competition. Is this what the FCC seeks
to promote? If the CAPs are using low cost technologies to offer only
selected portions of the network (while displacing the LECs' productive
capacity), then, by definition, their cost is the stand-alone cost of offering
that piece of the network. Alternately, the stand-alone cost of a service

100. See JOHN T. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND

POUCY 164-65 (1987); and, David Kaserman & John Mayo, Market-Based Regulation of a
Quasi-Monopoly: A Transition Policy for Telecommunications, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 395, 407

(1987).
101. However, subscribers demanding access to the public switched network from relatively

remote locations are likely to encounter prices that reflect most (if not all) the costs incurred to
reach those locations.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

37

California Western Law Review, Vol. 28 [1991], No. 2, Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

equates to the entry-inducing price (or entry-inducing revenues). Given this,
the prices contained in LECs' access tariffs, by virtue of technological
advances, probably exceed the stand-alone cost of that corresponding portion
of the network. What then should public policymakers do to alleviate what
is essentially a pricing problem caused by both deliberately cautious
regulation and rapidly advancing technology? Regardless of the answer, be
it collocation or other solutions, extremely liberal pricing flexibility for the
LECs is inevitable for the emergence of true competition. In this regard,
regulatory philosophy should emulate Judge Easterbrook's interpretation of
government's role in overseeing the operations of American industries: "the
1
antitrust laws are for the benefit of competition, not competitors." 0
Indeed, the FCC seems to recognize this principle, although it also appears
reluctant to initiate major regulatory reform quickly. For example, FCC
Commissioner Duggan clearly realizes that the regulatory practice of
allowing "competitive" rates for new entrants, while requiring averaged rates
for existing carriers' services, will probably prove to be unsustainable in the
long run."ro
While allowing true creamskimmers into the interexchange access
market, if, in fact, that is what the CAPs are, may lead to lower prices for
some customers, the overall policy itself may still be inimical to the public
interest. Asymmetric regulation, however, may obscure the overall flaws in
such a public policy. Economic theory holds that if the LECs are the most
efficient suppliers (and without downward pricing flexibility, the answer will
likely remain unknown), then they should be presented the opportunity to
retain those customers faced with alternate suppliers via the ability to set
competitive prices."
B. CollocationDoes Not GuaranteePrice Competition
Although collocation policies can produce changes in the local access
market that will unambiguously benefit both CAPs and IXCs, the potential
for passing a significant portion of these benefits on to all telecommunica102. See Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir.
1986) in which the court said that "Competition is a ruthless process. A firm that reduces cost
and expands sales injures rivals, sometimes fatally. The firm that slashes costs the most captures
the greatest sales and inflicts the greatest injury. The deeper the injury to rivals, the greater the
potential benefit. These injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous competition, and the
antitrust laws are not balm for rivals' wounds." Id. See also, Microtel, Inc. v. Florida Public
Service Commission, 464 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1985), in which the appellate court rejected
appellant Microtel's claim that it was entitled to be protected from competition in the long
distance market until it had had a reasonable time to establish itself in the marketplace. Id. at
1191-92. The court ruled that the state statute on which Microtel relied, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
364.345(1) (West Supp. 1991), was intended to protect consumers, not telephone companies.
Microtel had also argued that the public interest would be served by a protective period in which
Microtel would be shielded from competition, but the court rejected this argument as well.
Microtel, 464 So. 2d at 1192.
103. Duggan, supra note 97, at 2.
104. Laffont & Tirole, supra note 70, at 1055.
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tions customers in general is not as readily apparent."0 5 By allowing CAPs
access to customers not located on their existing networks, collocation clearly
expands CAPs' revenue (and presumably profit) potential. Likewise, if CAP
prices are typically lower than those of the LECs, IXCs will realize access
bill reductions by substituting CAP services for those provided by LECs.
However, it is not clear that access prices will decline to the point dictated
by vigorous competition in this market. Furthermore, it is not altogether
certain that the full reduction in IXCs' access payments will necessarily be
reflected in lower interexchange toll prices paid by all end users.
If CAPs and LECs are equally efficient (or nearly so) providers of
exchange access transport services in those narrow portions of the market in
which CAPs choose to operate, then CAP and LEC marginal costs should be
similar. Furthermore, both CAP and LEC prices are likely higher then
marginal cost since both CAPs and LECs are profitably providing services
to IXCs and end users. CAP prices, however, are generally lower than LEC
prices." Perhaps LECs' average access prices cannot be lowered sufficiently to meet the expectations of declining prices held by customers located
in the relatively narrow geographic areas experiencing CAP construction
activity and still recover the LECs company-wide costs of providing service.
CAPs would then have no incentive to lower prices below the levels at which
they successfully entered the market. Alternatively, if local access markets
were allowed to function in a fully competitive fashion with LECs having the
same pricing flexibility as displayed by CAPs, LEC prices could fall in those
geographic markets where the cost of providing service is below the
company-wide average cost (likely the same markets which appear attractive
to CAPs). Given the assumption that LECs and CAPs are equally efficient
providers of local transport services, both CAP and LEC prices could be
expected to decline toward their respective marginal costs. This downward
adjustment in prices would continue until economic profits disappeared and
only the normal market return could be earned on access providers'
investments. Absent a movement away from geographically averaged LEC
prices, if CAP prices allow for economic profits and LECs cannot signifl105. The distribution of benefits among IXCs, however, is unlikely to be uniform. In fact,
smaller IXCs could be worse off. IXCs are expected to be presented with more appealing
alternatives than the current LEC usage sensitive (i.e., per minute) switched access local
transport charges. For instance, that CAPs will offer transmission capacity at a flat rate per
circuit is anticipated. Furthermore, LECs conceivably will also be permitted to offer IXCs a flat
rate local transport option. Such a flat rate alternative will be particularly attractive to larger
IXCs with a substantial amount of traffic traveling over selected high volume routes.
Conversely, smaller IXCs, lacking the financial resources to construct their own facilities and
having traffic volumes insufficient to justify either LEC or CAP supplied dedicated transport
circuits, will likely continue paying usage sensitive switched access transport charges. Thus, the
effective price per minute of use will likely be substantially higher for smaller IXCs than for
those IXCs able to take advantage of high volume flat rate alternatives.
106. CAPs typically maintain prices that are 10% to 20% lower than LEC tariffed rates. This
price differential has been widely noted. For example, see Bushaus, supra note 45, at 50;
Charles Siler, How to Bypass Your Friendly Phone Company, FORBES, Aug. 21, 1989, at 88,
89; Mulqueen, supra note 40, at 67.
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cantly lower company-wide access prices, there is no incentive for access
prices to move toward the direct costs of providing service within major
metropolitan areas despite the apparent presence of CAP competition. With
CAPs rationally maximizing profits and LECs trying to maintain contribution
levels, IXC access payments will likely continue to include some (albeit
diminished) contribution toward the recovery of LEC fixed and shared costs
and support the maintenance of above normal CAP profit levels.
In addition, IXCs will not necessarily reduce toll rates paid by all
customers whose traffic eventually is delivered to a POP via a CAP circuit
as opposed to a LEC circuit. The intensity of competition in the interexchange toll market is perhaps the most powerful determinant of whether access
savings derived from substituting CAP services, where available, for LEC
offerings ultimately result in long distance price reductions.
Competition for the long distance business of large corporate and
institutional customers (e.g., governmental agencies and universities) is
clearly more vigorous than the weaker competitive environment that prevails
in the small business and residence market segments. 107 Thus, the competitive nature of the long distance market indicates that toll price reductions can
be anticipated for large business customers as a result of CAP and/or IXC
collocation activities. For example, some interexchange access services,
particularly special access circuits, are components of broader service
configurations offered by IXCs to corporate customers subject to prices and
provisions within separately negotiated contracts. Prices for such comprehensive service configurations, including the potential renegotiation of
existing contracts, will likely reflect IXCs' access cost reductions resulting
from collocation opportunities.
While price reductions for long distance packages tailored specifically for
customers generating large calling volumes are likely to follow the implementation of a national collocation policy, significant price reductions can not
clearly be expected for more casual toll service users. IXCs will probably
recognize an opportunity to retain a, perhaps significant, portion of any
switched access savings associated with the delivery of small volume
customers' traffic that accompany collocation activities. To the extent that
the small business and residence toll market segments (whose calls are more
likely billed according to IXCs' general toll tariffs rather than special long
distance package prices) are not as competitive as the large business segment,
the general public could experience significantly smaller long distance price
reductions than those anticipated for large corporate customers.
Perhaps referring to the potential for avoiding reductions in IXCs'
general toll tariffs, as opposed to the likely increased discounts presented to
107. For example, the FCC has decided, on the basis of the competitive nature of the market,
to streamline its regulation of AT&T's large business customer services. See Competition in the
Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 5 F.C.C.R. 2627. See also Richard E. Simnett,
Contestable Markets and Telecommunications, in DEREGULATION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF

UTILTIES 127, 141 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1989).
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large corporate customers, CAPs have expressly recognized that IXC access
savings need not be completely eliminated by price decreases. Indeed, a
CAP executive has pointed out that: "The interexchange carrier generally
pays less for both installation and recurring charges for competitive [CAP]
service. And unlike reductions in ... charges made by the BOCs, these

savings need not be flowed through to the end user. The long distance
carrier may keep the savings for itself to improve its own bottom line."108
C. Collocation Can Have Isolated Effects On Market Prices
Since CAP prices tend to be lower than corresponding LEC prices,"°9
general downward pressure on access prices can be expected in those cities
in which CAPs have deployed facilities. However, this downward pressure
on prices is currently restricted to the urban areas targeted by CAP
operations. Because LECs are constrained by regulation to establish average
prices for their services, any LEC access price reductions affect revenues
generated throughout a LEC's service territory. To the extent that such
territory-wide price reductions influence a LEC's ability to achieve a "fair
and reasonable" return from its interexchange access operations, declining
LEC prices might not accompany the emergence of competitive pressures in
metropolitan areas. If a LEC general price reduction does not occur, then
it is unlikely that customers located beyond the scope of an existing CAP
network will observe declining access charges. Thus, because CAPs are not
attracted to smaller, rural population areas, price reductions can be expected
to apply only to large corporate accounts located in or near the core business
districts of major cities where CAP facilities are deployed.
Even if regulatory approval of LEC access tariff restructuring is obtained
in conjunction with collocation, CAPs' view of the relative attractiveness of
various geographic markets probably will not change markedly. Although
collocation will likely spur increased construction activity, major metropolitan areas will surely attract most, if not all, additional CAP investments.
Building fiber optic transmission facilities between suburban LEC local
switching offices and IXC POPs located in the same city appears to be a
more reasonable investment pattern than constructing backbone networks in
rural areas. Thus, the benefits of lower IXC access prices will likely remain
concentrated in major metropolitan areas following implementation of
collocation policies.
In fact, even if collocation is achieved, CAPs might continue to offer
lower access prices to only those business customers whose buildings are

108. MFS Senior Vice President Robert Douglas Bradbury confirmed that this quote was from
his speech before the ACTA Conference on September 11, 1990, in his March 25, 1991
deposition (pp. 66-67) in Texas Public Utility Commission Docket No. 9796. The quote also
appears in Comments of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Expanded Interconnection
NPRMINOI, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259 app. B, at 9-10 (filed August 6, 1991).
109. See, e.g., Bushaus, supra note 45, at 50.
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located on a CAP backbone network. While a CAP might collocate its
transmission facilities in a suburban LEC local switching office for the
purpose of aggregating multiple customers' private lines and, potentially,
switched access traffic, the CAP might intend to transport this aggregated
traffic to IXCs' POPs without making direct contact with the customers
whose traffic is being aggregated. This approach offers IXCs alternative
transmission suppliers, diverse and redundant facility routes, and lower local
transport prices for telecommunications traffic traversing the distance
between suburban LEC central offices and IXCs' POPs. However, if their
intention is to be an alternate transport provider for IXCs, CAPs would not
necessarily offer the same alternatives to suburban customers desiring disaster
recovery services at prices below those in LEC tariffs to secure the
transmission path between their buildings and the LEC local switching office.
Thus, collocation guarantees neither that suburban telecommunications
customers will receive the direct benefits of CAP disaster recovery services
nor that price discounts will be extended to customers whose locations lie
beyond the scope of a CAP backbone network. The customers likely to
benefit the most from CAP collocation arrangements with LECs are the
IXCs. The benefits accruing to end users might remain restricted to those
whose buildings are located within the narrow confines of the downtown core
business districts of large cities where CAPs have already deployed
networks. Therefore, collocation should not be expected to extend the
benefits of CAP competition to business and residence customers throughout
entire metropolitan areas. Additionally, collocation will likely provide even
fewer benefits to customers in areas outside major urban population
D. Collocation Will Not Necessarily Produce TechnologicalInnovation
Since CAPs construct entirely new facilities in the cities they choose to
enter, they can deploy networks using the most technologically advanced
components including both hardware and software. With the latest software
and equipment, CAPs can be expected to provide sophisticated monitoring,
testing, and network control functions.110 Furthermore, since CAPs have
neither an obligation nor any clear intention of offering service to all
telecommunications users, they can place fiber optic network facilities only
along lucrative routes and focus marketing and customer service efforts on
a small number of highly strategic accounts. This ability to focus attention
and investment on satisfying the demands of a small segment of customers
could lead to a perception that CAPs have provided an impetus for accelerating the development and deployment of new services and technologies.
However, perhaps CAPs have not been the primary driving force behind
technological and service advances.
Incorporating the latest technology into the expansion of existing, or
110. For a description of CAPs' network capabilities, see Bushaus, supra note 45, at 48-54.
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construction of new, capacity is a rational business decision designed to
enhance productivity and avoid short-term technological obsolescence. The
CAPs' deployment of fiber optic telecommunications transmission facilities
could have resulted from such a decision process. This, however, does not
indicate that CAPs are the cause of recent telecommunications technology
advances. In fact, if CAPs are directly engaged in research and development, their activities have not been well publicized."' LECs, on the other
hand, expend both financial and human resources in searching for new
telecommunications technologies. With the increasing sophistication of the
marketplace, particularly the large business segment, LECs' financial
strength, at least to some extent, has become dependent upon satisfying the
demands of customers whose knowledge of networks and functions
sometimes rivals that of the LECs themselves."' Such an environment
demands that successful suppliers place a high value on promoting technological improvement.
LECs have continuously incorporated technological advances into their
networks in order to develop new services both in response to and in
anticipation of demands from increasingly sophisticated customers. For
example, digital switches and fiber optic transmission facilities have been
deployed by LECs throughout the country over the past several years.
By the end of 1988, for instance, the BOCs had installed more than 1.5
million fiber miles; in addition, IXCs had installed over 1.8 million fiber
miles. 4 This deployment of fiber optic cable was accomplished at a time
when the CAP industry was in its infancy. Even following the rapid industry
growth of the past few years, CAPs had installed less than 55,000 fiber miles
by the end of 1990.115 Obviously, CAPs were not the single motivating
force behind the rapid incorporation of fiber optics into the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure.
Collocation opportunities will provide CAPs added incentives to increase
the amount of fiber optic cable installed in the nation's telecommunications
infrastructure. However, the capacity of existing fiber optic transmission
facilities already represents a tenfold increase over the capacity of AT&T's
predivestiture toll network. 6 Thus, the value added to the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure by any additional capacity resulting from increased

111. This is not to suggest that CAPs do not pay for some portion of the research and

development expenditures required to produce advanced technologies. Vendors presumably

recover such costs in the prices of products incorporating new technologies.
112. For example, many large corporations have constructed, operate, and maintain national
telecommunications networks.
113. For example, the implementation of Signalling System 7 will enable such services as

"Caller ID," which allows for the identification of the originating telephone number at the site
of the terminating telephone.
114. JONATHAN KRAUSHAAR, FEDERAL COMmuNICAiONS COMMISSION, FIBER DEPLOYMENT
UPDATE: END OF YEAR, at 19, 21 (1989).

115. Id. at 32.
116. See KRAUSHAAR, supra note 114.
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CAP fiber deployment motivated by collocation will likely be small.
Furthermore, the regional distribution of fiber optic capacity will probably
change little as a result of CAP collocation activities, with CAP investment
remaining concentrated in major urban centers and little attention being given
to rural customers. While CAP fiber optic transmission facilities might
appear in cities which otherwise might not have attracted the interest of a
CAP, networks in such second tier cities will likely be less intricate and
significantly smaller than CAP networks in larger cities. In addition,
collocation could produce a CAP investment pattern which might dictate the
placement of fiber cable directly between LEC local switching offices and
IXC POPs in metropolitan areas without requiring an expansion of existing,
or installation of new, CAP backbone networks. To the extent that CAP
networks add any value to the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure, the
social value associated with an increased number of private lines directly
connecting LEC central offices and IXC POPs is likely less than would be
produced by more extensive network construction or expansion.
Attempts to reduce costs, improve operating efficiency, and effectively
deliver new services by incorporating technological advances into existing
LEC networks have provided strong demand for technology producing firms
such as switch manufacturers and software developers. In addition, CAPs
have taken advantage of the continuous innovation in telecommunications
technology by incorporating such advances into their networks as any
well-run business would. They have not, however, appeared particularly
interested in invention. While CAPs might represent a new customer set for
telecommunications technology producing firms (i.e., hardware and software
manufacturers) and, hence, have perhaps increased the demand for existing
technology, it is not clear that they have substantially accelerated the pace at
which telecommunications technology is advancing.
E. CollocationMight Not Yield An Explosion Of New Services
Beyond their deployment of fiber optic transmission facilities, perhaps
the most widely discussed contribution of CAPs to the telecommunications
market is "disaster recovery" or "network protection" service.11 7 However, such services have also been provided by LECs, subject to tariff prices
and restrictions or special construction policies or both. Thus, CAPs did not
introduce an innovative new service which LECs were incapable of providing
to the IXC access market.
The local switching office disaster in Illinois which focused national
attention on the provision of telecommunications network protection evoked

117. See, for example, Mulqueen, supra note 40, at 67; Taff, supra note 43, at 12; Bushaus,
supra note 45, at 50; Knight & Vinton, supra note 42, at 33; Kelner, supra note 48, at 21;
Titch, supra note 48, at 54; and Siler, supra note 106, at 89.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss2/4

44

Larson and Mudd: Collocation and Telecommunications Policy: A Fostering of Competi

19921

COLLOCATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

an immediate response from the affected IXCs."' Equipment to link large
business customers directly to POPs was quickly installed." 9 This situation
would likely have produced an increased demand for, and a resultant LEC
supply of, disaster recovery/network protection type services, with the
necessary LEC investment in network architecture changes, even in the
complete absence of CAPs. Any attempted LEC refusal to supply such
heavily demanded services would likely have motivated IXCs to incur the
required investment themselves in order to assure their largest toll customers
continuous, uninterrupted access to national long distance networks. Thus,
the evolution of disaster recovery services probably did not hinge entirely on
the activities of CAPs.
Collocation will provide CAPs an opportunity to expand their offerings
of disaster recovery services to IXCs. However, network protection services
covering the connections between POPs and suburban LEC central offices are
not unique to CAPs. LEC network investment strategies and new service
offerings include such disaster recovery alternatives not only for IXC links
to local switching offices but also to assure end users uninterrupted access to
the public switched network (both local central offices and IXC POPs).'1
These LEC services would undoubtedly have come about regardless of CAP
operations. "AT&T was the driving force, at least in Texas, behind SWBT
[Southwestern Bell Telephone) offering several new customer network
protection options."' Thus, market responses to changing demand conditions could well have been, and likely will continue to be, at least as
significant as, if not more significant than, CAP construction activities in
determining the emergence of services that ensure access to IXC networks.
VII. LEC PRICING FLEXIBILITY WILL BE NECESSARY
FOR EFFECTIVE COMPETITION

National telecommunications pricing policies have traditionally preserved
the concept of average prices. The result has been to assure that the same
price applies to an interstate telecommunications service regardless of the
usage characteristics and geographic locations of purchasers. However, LEC

and IXC costs of providing various telecommunications services likely vary
between high usage urban areas and low volume rural locations. With a

single price across all situations, prices are likely further above costs in
urban areas than in rural areas. Perhaps costs even exceed prices in sparsely
118. See Kellner, supra note 48; and Titch, supra note 48.
119. See Carnavale, supra note 47.
120. The availability of such LEC services is limited only by the speed at which prudent
public utility investment can be accomplished to equip local central offices with the necessary
technical capabilities. LEC disaster recovery services, like those of CAPs, are not currently
universally available. For a discussion of Regional Bell Operating Company responses to market
demands for network protection services, see Mark Mikolas, RBOC Strategiesfor Local Loop
Reliability, Bus. COMM. REv., Oct. 1990, at 48, 48-53.
121. Id. at 50.
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populated rural regions. Economically efficient pricing arguments suggest
that, if these cost-price relationships hold, rural prices should rise while
urban prices should fall. The implementation of a collocation policy could
create market forces strong enough to reverse the application of average
prices to LEC-provided access services.
Because CAP prices are typically below those of LECs, market prices
in cities containing both LEC and CAP networks are probably lower than in
metropolitan areas served only by LECs. Thus, at least to some extent,
CAPs have affected the geographic deaveraging of special access market
prices quite independently from apparent policy goals. The more successful
CAPs become, perhaps by capturing some particular share of the interexchange access market, the more inconsistent a policy requiring LECs to adhere
to average pricing techniques appears. Indeed, Commissioner Duggan points
out, "our current regulatory practice-to allow 'competitive' rates for new
entrants, while requiring averaged rates for existing carriers' services-will
probably prove unsustainable in the long run."1"
Perhaps collocation will accelerate the growth of CAPs and thereby
hasten the demise of average pricing in the interexchange access market.
The FCC is obviously aware of such a possibility, as it requested public
comments on potential LEC special access rate structure changes such as
"volume discounts, or distance-sensitive pricing of connection charges...
or... proposals to increase channel termination charges for the connection
from the customer premise to the end office and to reduce rates for the
connection between the LEC end office and the IXC POP."" z
The traditional rationale for volume discounts is predicated on the
probability of declining marginal costs of installing additional special access
circuits between two specific locations, given that a first circuit is to be
installed. Such a LEC pricing position, with CAPs already having the ability
to offer volume discounts at their discretion, would presumably result in
special access market prices that more closely reflect the cost differences
arising from providing various specified levels of service. The FCC also
appears to envision a potential LEC access rate structure which distinguishes
between originating and terminating services. One possible rationale for this
approach involves a presumed desire to encourage active price competition
in the interexchange access market. For example, if the portion of special
access circuits connecting LEC local offices to IXC POPs is perceived as the
immediate focus of competition (as opposed to the segments of circuits
connecting widely divergent customer locations to LEC offices), then
bifurcating the channel termination charges or connection charges could
produce more frequent price adjustments than adhering to a single channel
termination charge regardless of circumstances.
Notwithstanding the
particular form taken by LEC rate restructuring, vigorous competition in the

122. Duggan, supra, note 97, at 2.
123. Expanded Interconnection NOI/NPRM, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259
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access market will, in the long run, hinge on LECs possessing the same
ability as CAPs in developing prices which reflect local market conditions-including customers' geographic locations, the quantities and
configurations of services requested, and the costs of providing the specified
services.
Essentially, the LECs should be afforded the same downward pricing
flexibility that CAPs have, with price reductions being presumed lawful
without any cumbersome showing of costs. While it is appealing and
seemingly plausible to impose restrictions on the LECs' abilities to lower
prices to compete with the CAPs, the regulatory status quo probably will not
work. Regulatory cost studies are designed to address regulatory average
pricing in the situation where the LEC must offer the same prices to all
customers wanting a service, and must price its services to obtain a revenue
requirement, which itself may have been determined by fully distributed
costs. The situation in which the LECs must price so as to retain business
in competition with the CAPs is different and thus should be treated
differently. The LECs should be granted the type of pricing flexibility that
large, unregulated multiproduct firms now have, and in fact use when
competing with each other. The maintenance of price floors in conjunction
with competition in the IXC access market can do nothing but impede
legitimate and lawful competitive responses of the LECs. If a cost standard
is required, then the cost standard of average variable cost could be
used.1" Yet even this cost brightline may lack usefulness in the context
of meeting the competitive pressures of the CAPs.1'
Some antitrust courts have in fact, indicated that meeting competition is
an absolute defense to allegations of predatory pricing, apparently even if
prices fall below average variable cost."~ In the words of one court, "[a]
company should not be guilty of predatory pricing, regardless of its costs,
when it reduces prices to meet lower prices already being charged by its
competitors." 127

124. This is the point at which contribution to overhead is zero, and below which any firm
will simply shut down and exit the market voluntarily, if it thought revenues would dip below
average variable cost for a significant period of time.
125. Economic arguments for questioning the benefits of price floors are contained in
Alexander C. Larson & Mark P. Sievers, On the Ineffectiveness ofPrice Floorsin Telecommunications Regulation, 25 WIUAMEr L. REV. 89 (1989). And see Alexander C. Larson &
William E. Kovacic, PredatoryPricingSafeguards in Telecommunications Regulation:Removing
Impediments to Competition, 35 ST. LOUIS U.L. J. 1 (1990).
126. See Richard B. Rogers, Predatory Pricing: A PracticalPerspective, 5 ANTITRUST 9
(1990) (citing Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); D.E. Rogers Assocs.
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1435 (6th. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242
(1984); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basis Resources, 547 F. Supp. 893, 910 (S.D. Ohio
1981), aft'd, 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th. Cir. 1982); ILC Peripherals v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); Lormar v. Korger Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,498, at 76,911 (S.D. Ohio 1979). See also, Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th. Cir. 1986).
127. ILC Peripherals,458 F. Supp. at 433.
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Indeed, from a social perspective, for the LECs to charge marginal
prices below marginal cost for the services subject to competition from the
CAPs may be optimal. Because the corresponding high-use customers must
be granted advantageous terms to be retained by the LECs, low-use
customers must be dissuaded from buying the high-use customers' bundle of
services by charging a high fixed fee and a low marginal price." If this
is the case, then again, considerable downward pricing flexibility will be
needed to promote true competition and not mere creamskimmer entry at the
expense of other customers.
VIII. IXCs' INCENTIVES TO COLLOCATE

The implementation of collocation tariffs will present IXCs an attractive
alternative to both LEC and CAP services. Substantial economic incentives
for IXCs to collocate their own transmission equipment in LEC local
switching offices will arise. There appears to be no restriction preventing
IXCs from simply declaring themselves collocated by virtue of the fact that
special access circuits (i.e., dedicated transmission facilities) currently link
each POP to each LEC central office in major cities.
Because of variable LEC mileage charges, IXCs could realize significant
access bill reductions by collocating transmission equipment in LEC offices
located some distance away from downtown POPs and supplying their own
transmission facilities. To the extent that IXCs might consider constructing
transmission links that simply parallel existing LEC facilities connecting local
switching offices to POPs, LECs could be presented with offers by EKCs to
purchase installed cable (i.e., current transmission capacity). Alternatively,
a situation could arise in which transmission capacity is duplicated with the
result that LECs are left with substantial excess capacity. Depending upon
the routes chosen by IXCs for independently tying POPs to LEC offices,
infrastructure concerns might be irrelevant."n Less value would be added
to the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure by a construction pattern that
produces a second series of "straight line" connections between end user
serving offices and IXC networks than would result from extensive
construction of fiber optic connections reflecting ring network architectures,
regardless of what firms (LECs or CAPs) incurred the necessary network
investment. Given the incentives presented by a national collocation policy,
IXCs should be expected to take full advantage of opportunities to reduce
access payments to LECs, either by initiating their own construction

128. Laffont & Tirole, supra note 70, at 1055.
129. The telecommunications infrastructure generally refers to the amount and technological
sophistication of the transmission, switching, and other equipment deployed in telecomununications networks throughout the country. Policymakers' and others' concerns about ensuring the
continuous enhancement of the U.S. telecommunications networks are discussed at length in
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 201, 283 (1991).
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programs or attempting to purchase existing LEC transmission facilities.
Although the FCC is currently considering the feasibility of collocation
for only special access (i.e., private line) service, IXCs would still have
incentives to take advantage of special access collocation because of the
potential for reducing switched access payments to LECs. Insofar as
switched traffic is currently transported to IXC POPs via special access
circuits, while switched and special access traffic can be (and sometimes is)
transported over the same facility (e.g., fiber optic cable), the prices charged
for transport service are significantly different. Switched access transport is
assessed a charge per minute; special access is assessed a flat monthly charge
per circuit, regardless of the number of minutes transported across that
circuit. Once IXCs have collocated at LEC central offices for the purpose
of supplying their own special access transport service, they should be
expected to request switched access traffic be delivered to the same circuits.
Indeed, to the extent that multi-year contracts for high capacity special access
service between LEC central offices and IXC POPs already are in force and
these longer-term lease commitments might be deemed to constitute IXC
"ownership" of the transmission facility, then no additional investment need
be incurred for IXCs to simply declare themselves collocated, with a POP
effectively established inside the LEC local switching office at the point
where the special access circuit terminates. The effect of such an arrangement would be to reduce the distance sensitive switched access local transport
rate to the 0-1 mileage band for each minute of use originating from or
terminating at a LEC local serving office in which an IXC had collocated.
Thus, attempts to restrict the effects of collocation to the special access
market will ultimately prove unsuccessful as IXCs strive to minimize total
access payments to LECs. That is IXCs will likely use collocated special
access circuits to transport switched access traffic and thereby reduce-albeit
not eliminate-switched access payments to LECs.
CONCLUSIONS

Advancing competition within the U.S. telecommunications industry is
a key public policy goal of the FCC. An opportunity has arisen for the FCC
to assess whether the evolving competitive nature of various telecommunications markets can be strengthened by integrating the private networks of
CAPs with the local telephone companies' and long distance carriers' public
networks. The FCC apparently views CAPs as the primary vehicle for
introducing serious competition into certain portions of the market for local
exchange telephone services. Regulatory authorities' restructuring of the
industry, however, does not automatically guarantee true competition with
all its attendant public benefits. Awareness of this uncertainty is essential to
an objective assessment of the social value of national policy decisions
designed to encourage firms to enter local telephone service markets.
CAPs are seeking regulatory approval to collocate transmission
equipment inside or near LEC local serving offices. This arrangement is
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perceived as necessary to establishing effective competition with LECs for
transporting telecommunications traffic between customers' local serving
offices and IXCs' long distance networks (i.e., the interexchange access
market). Although LECs currently offer interconnection services, the
regulatory process has produced tariffed prices high enough to preclude
profitable operations if CAPs were to merely resell existing LEC services.
Collocation is presented as a way to substantially reduce the price at which
access to LECs' local networks can be secured. Favorable tariff treatment
of collocation arrangements will afford CAPs, IXCs, and any other business
entities the opportunity and incentive to construct transmission facilities
between LECs' local serving offices and IXCs' networks. Thus, the FCC
can almost certainly ensure an increase in the number of firms supplying
interexchange access services by restructuring LEC tariffs to include minimal
collocation prices.
However, a regulatory policy that produces an increased number of
interexchange access suppliers does not necessarily also yield social welfare
gains. If the interexchange access market is currently perceived as a
monopoly with LECs, for all practical purposes, the sole suppliers, an
improved market structure is possible only if the current monopoly industry
configuration is inefficient. Although an addition of firms to the industry
might be feasible, such that all new entrants might at least break even, it
would be nearly impossible to ascertain a priori that the new entrants would
produce the most efficient industry configuration such that the entrants in
combination with incumbents would satisfy aggregate market demand at the
lowest possible total industry cost of production. Thus, if regulatory actions
are based upon the notions that a competitive industry is simply one in which
many suppliers operate and such an industry configuration is somehow
necessarily more efficient than any other configuration, creamskimmer entry,
rather than true competition, could be the result of well-intentioned, but
hastily analyzed, policy decisions.
For example, if CAPs would in fact function as creamskimmers in the
interexchange access market, their entry would signal little more than the
exploitation of regulators' application of average prices to LEC services. By
focusing intently on narrowly defined geographic market segments containing
dense concentrations of high volume long distance customers such as
typically exist in the downtown core business districts of large cities, CAPs
likely can maintain profitability, indicating the new industry configuration is
feasible, without necessarily having to be more efficient producers than
incumbent LECs. CAP entry need not necessarily produce a decline in total
industry costs. If collocation simply attracts creamskimmer entry (the
entrants who are less efficient, higher cost producers than incumbents), into
the interexchange access market, few if any of the benefits typically
attributed to competitive markets are likely to be realized.
Regulatory adherence to traditional average pricing of LEC services
implies that price competition in the interexchange access market would
remain unlikely, even subsequent to adoption of collocation policies intended
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to spur such competition. CAPs could simply allow regulation to set an
average price for LEC local transport and then offer nominal discounts
relative to LEC price levels. Encouragement of true price competition
requires LECs be extended the same pricing flexibility exercised by other
suppliers. Geographically de-averaged prices, specific service contracts and
prices for individual customers, volume discounts, and various promotional
pricing campaigns are some of the pricing strategies available to CAPs but
denied to LECs. Absent full LEC pricing flexibility, implementation of a
collocation policy designed to encourage entry into the interexchange access
market might accomplish little more than a wealth transfer from incumbent
LECs to new entrants, primarily CAPs and IXCs. Furthermore, maintenance
of rigid LEC prices would prevent a collocation policy from even producing
a valid, yet quite irreversible experiment to test whether the prevailing
industry configuration is indeed inefficient.
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